CVE-2020-15215: Context isolation bypass in Electron
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 22/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.68% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 52.6% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: electron (npm) 10.1.2, 11.0.0-beta.6, 8.5.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to electron (npm) 10.1.2, 11.0.0-beta.6, 8.5.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Electron before versions 11.0.0-beta.6, 10.1.2, 9.3.1 or 8.5.2 is vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Apps using both `contextIsolation` and `sandbox: true` are affected. Apps using both `contextIsolation` and `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames: true` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
- Published
- Oct 6, 2020
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 52th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-668
Report tools
Action score
22
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 22 / 40 · 5.6 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 5.6
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 5.6
- agree
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| electronjs | electron | cpe:2.3:a:electronjs:electron |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- electronjs electron10.0.0
- electronjs electron10.0.1
- electronjs electron10.1.0
- electronjs electron10.1.1
- electronjs electron11.0.0
- electronjs electron8.0.0
- electronjs electron8.0.1
- electronjs electron8.0.2
- electronjs electron8.0.3
- electronjs electron8.1.0
- electronjs electron8.1.1
- electronjs electron8.2.0
- electronjs electron8.2.1
- electronjs electron8.2.2
- electronjs electron8.2.3
- electronjs electron8.2.4
- electronjs electron8.2.5
- electronjs electron8.3.0
- electronjs electron8.3.1
- electronjs electron8.3.2
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
electron electron
- >= 8.0.0-beta.0, < 8.5.2, >= 9.0.0-beta.0, < 9.3.1, >= 10.0.0-beta.0, < 10.1.2, >= 11.0.0-beta.0, < 11.0.0-beta.6affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | electron | from 10.0.0-beta.0 · before 10.1.2 | 10.1.2 |
| npm | electron | from 11.0.0-beta.0 · before 11.0.0-beta.6 | 11.0.0-beta.6 |
| npm | electron | from 8.0.0-beta.0 · before 8.5.2 | 8.5.2 |
| npm | electron | from 9.0.0-beta.0 · before 9.3.1 | 9.3.1 |
Same product
electronjs: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2017-16151Based on details posted by the ElectronJS team; A remote code execution vulnerability has been discovered in Google Chromium that affects al40Plan
- CVE-2026-102676Electron: <webview> can enable Node.js integration in Web Workers despite embedder restrictions39Monitor
- CVE-2026-34775Electron: nodeIntegrationInWorker not correctly scoped in shared renderer processes39Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2020-4077Jul 6, 2020 · Context isolation bypass via contextBridge in Electron39Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2020-15174Oct 6, 2020 · Unpreventable top-level navigation in Electron30Monitor
- Later →CVE-2020-26272Jan 28, 2021 · Electron vulnerable to ID collision when routing IPC messages to renderers containing OOPIFs27Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:electron | 10.1.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:electron | 11.0.0-beta.6 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:electron | 8.5.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:electron | 9.3.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:16 | 2022-05-13 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+583 d
- TodayNov 5, 2026+2221 d
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- low · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- Low
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-668 · Exposure of Resource to Wrong SphereCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.