CVE-2020-14099: On Xiaomi router AX1800 rom version < 1.0.336 and RM1800 root version < 1.0.26, the encryption scheme for a user's backup files uses hard-co
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.59% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
On Xiaomi router AX1800 rom version < 1.0.336 and RM1800 root version < 1.0.26, the encryption scheme for a user's backup files uses hard-coded keys, which can expose sensitive information such as a user's password.
- Published
- Apr 8, 2021
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 48th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-798
Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| mi | ax1800 firmware | cpe:2.3:o:mi:ax1800_firmware |
| mi | ax1800 | cpe:2.3:h:mi:ax1800 |
| mi | rm1800 firmware | cpe:2.3:o:mi:rm1800_firmware |
| mi | rm1800 | cpe:2.3:h:mi:rm1800 |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- mi ax1800 firmwarebefore 1.0.336
- mi rm1800 firmwarebefore 1.0.26
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Xiaomi). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
n/a Xiaomi Router AX1800,Xiaomi Rourer RM1800
- Xiaomi Router AX1800 rom version < 1.0.336, Xiaomi Router RM1800 root version < 1.0.26affected
Same product
mi: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2020-14101The data collection SDK of the router web management interface caused the leakage of the token.30Monitor
- CVE-2020-14098The login verification can be bypassed by using the problem that the time is not synchronized after the router restarts.30Monitor
- CVE-2020-14102There is command injection when ddns processes the hostname, which causes the administrator user to obtain the root privilege of the router.29Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded CredentialsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-798 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";
const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";Fixed
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);
if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.