CVE-2020-10206: Use of a Hard-coded Password in VNCserver in Amino Communications AK45x series, AK5xx series, AK65x series, Aria6xx series, Aria7/AK7Xx seri
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.29% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Use of a Hard-coded Password in VNCserver in Amino Communications AK45x series, AK5xx series, AK65x series, Aria6xx series, Aria7/AK7Xx series and Kami7B allows local attackers to view and interact with the video output of the device.
- Published
- Dec 29, 2020
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 21th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-798
Report tools
Action score
17
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 17 / 40 · 4.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| amino | ak45x firmware | cpe:2.3:o:amino:ak45x_firmware |
| amino | ak45x | cpe:2.3:h:amino:ak45x |
| amino | ak5xx firmware | cpe:2.3:o:amino:ak5xx_firmware |
| amino | ak5xx | cpe:2.3:h:amino:ak5xx |
| amino | ak65x firmware | cpe:2.3:o:amino:ak65x_firmware |
| amino | ak65x | cpe:2.3:h:amino:ak65x |
| amino | aria6xx firmware | cpe:2.3:o:amino:aria6xx_firmware |
| amino | aria6xx | cpe:2.3:h:amino:aria6xx |
| amino | aria7xx firmware | cpe:2.3:o:amino:aria7xx_firmware |
| amino | aria7xx | cpe:2.3:h:amino:aria7xx |
| amino | kami7b firmware | cpe:2.3:o:amino:kami7b_firmware |
| amino | kami7b | cpe:2.3:h:amino:kami7b |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- amino ak45x firmwareall versions
- amino ak5xx firmwareall versions
- amino ak65x firmwareall versions
- amino aria6xx firmwareall versions
- amino aria7xx firmwareall versions
- amino kami7b firmwareall versions
Same product
amino: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2020-10208Command Injection in EntoneWebEngine in Amino Communications AK45x series, AK5xx series, AK65x series, Aria6xx series, Aria7/AK7Xx series an40Plan
- CVE-2020-10207Use of Hard-coded Credentials in EntoneWebEngine in Amino Communications AK45x series, AK5xx series, AK65x series, Aria6xx series, Aria7/AK740Plan
- CVE-2020-10210Because of hard-coded SSH keys for the root user in Amino Communications AK45x series, AK5xx series, AK65x series, Aria6xx series, Aria7/AK739Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →CVE-2020-10209Dec 29, 2020 · Command Injection in the CPE WAN Management Protocol (CWMP) registration in Amino Communications AK45x series, AK5xx series, AK65x series, A33Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded CredentialsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-798 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";
const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";Fixed
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);
if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.