A vulnerability in the SecureROM of some Apple devices can be exploited by an unauthenticated local attacker to execute arbitrary code upon
A vulnerability in the SecureROM of some Apple devices can be exploited by an unauthenticated local attacker to execute arbitrary code upon booting those devices. This vulnerability allows arbitrary code to be executed on the device. Exploiting the vulnerability requires physical access to the device: the device must be plugged in to a computer upon booting, and it must be put into Device Firmware Update (DFU) mode. The exploit is not persistent; rebooting the device overrides any changes to the device's software that were made during an exploited session on the device. Additionally, unless an attacker has access to the device's unlock PIN or fingerprint, an attacker cannot gain access to information protected by Apple's Secure Enclave or Touch ID features.
- Published
- Feb 21, 2025
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 68.6% · 99th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-94
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Report tools
Action score
48
Plan
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 27 / 40 · 6.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 21 / 30 · 68.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apple | securerom | cpe:2.3:o:apple:securerom |
| apple | a10 fusion | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a10_fusion |
| apple | a10x fusion | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a10x_fusion |
| apple | a11 bionic | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a11_bionic |
| apple | a5 | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a5 |
| apple | a5x | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a5x |
| apple | a6 | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a6 |
| apple | a6x | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a6x |
| apple | a7 | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a7 |
| apple | a8 | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a8 |
| apple | a8x | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a8x |
| apple | a9 | cpe:2.3:h:apple:a9 |
and 1 more
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apple secureromall versions
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apple). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apple SecureROM
- A5 and later · up to and including A11affected
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-10-03 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+588 d
- TodayOct 8, 2026+593 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Physical access to the device is required.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Physical
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-94 · Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
Change log
- Exploit maturitynone → poc
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References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.