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CVE-2019-6716· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

An unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Wicket Core in LogonBox Nervepoint Access Manager 2013 through 2017 allows a r

An unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Wicket Core in LogonBox Nervepoint Access Manager 2013 through 2017 allows a remote attacker to enumerate internal Active Directory usernames and group names, and alter back-end server jobs (backup and synchronization jobs), which could allow for the possibility of a Denial of Service attack via a modified jobId parameter in a runJob.html GET request.

CriticalCVSS 9.4 · v3.0—Proof of concept No fix recorded
Published
Mar 21, 2019
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
9.6% · 95th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

40

Plan

Add it to your regular patch cycle.

CVSS
37 / 40 · 9.4 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
3 / 30 · 9.6%

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Affected systems

VendorProduct
logonboxnervepoint access manager

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • logonbox nervepoint access manager1.2
  • logonbox nervepoint access manager1.3
  • logonbox nervepoint access manager1.4

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Exploit-DB entry ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Exploit-DB entrywebapps2019-01-28

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. First PoC-53 d
  2. Published
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+2750 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-639 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);res.json(invoice);

Fixed

ts
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({  id: req.params.id,  ownerId: req.user.id,});if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);res.json(invoice);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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