Premisys Identicard version 3.1.190 contains hardcoded credentials in the WCF service on port 9003.
Premisys Identicard version 3.1.190 contains hardcoded credentials in the WCF service on port 9003. An authenticated remote attacker can use these credentials to access the badge system database and modify its contents.
- Published
- Jan 18, 2019
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 2.9% · 86th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-798
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Report tools
Action score
36
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 2.9%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| identicard | premisys id | cpe:2.3:a:identicard:premisys_id |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- identicard premisys id3.1.190
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (tenable). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
n/a Premisys Identicard 3.1.190
- Premisys Identicard 3.1.190affected
Same product
identicard: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2019-3909Premisys Identicard version 3.1.190 database uses default credentials.40Plan
- CVE-2019-3908Premisys Identicard version 3.1.190 stores backup files as encrypted zip files.31Monitor
- CVE-2019-3907Premisys Identicard version 3.1.190 stores user credentials and other sensitive information with a known weak encryption method (MD5 hash of30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded CredentialsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-798 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";Fixed
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.