Rob Richards XmlSecLibs, all versions prior to v3.0.3, as used for example by SimpleSAMLphp, performed incorrect validation of cryptographic

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

• debian debian linux10.0
• debian debian linux8.0
• debian debian linux9.0
• simplesamlphp simplesamlphpup to 1.17.6 inclusive
• xmlseclibs project xmlseclibs3.0.0 and later · up to 3.0.3 inclusive
• xmlseclibs project xmlseclibs1.0.0 and later · up to 1.4.2 inclusive
• xmlseclibs project xmlseclibs2.0.0 and later · up to 2.1.0 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (debian). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

• n/a Rob Richards XmlSecLibs

  • All versions prior to version 3.0.3affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

• CVE-2018-6521The sqlauth module in SimpleSAMLphp before 1.15.2 relies on the MySQL utf8 charset, which truncates queries upon encountering four-byte char
  40Plan
• CVE-2017-12868The secureCompare method in lib/SimpleSAML/Utils/Crypto.php in SimpleSAMLphp 1.14.13 and earlier, when used with PHP before 5.6, allows atta
  40Plan
• CVE-2017-12873SimpleSAMLphp 1.7.0 through 1.14.10 might allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, gain unauthorized access, or have unspecified oth
  39Monitor
• CVE-2016-9814The validateSignature method in the SAML2\Utils class in SimpleSAMLphp before 1.14.10 and simplesamlphp/saml2 library before 1.9.1, 1.10.x b
  37Monitor
• CVE-2018-7711HTTPRedirect.php in the saml2 library in SimpleSAMLphp before 1.15.4 has an incorrect check of return values in the signature validation uti
  32Monitor
• CVE-2017-18122A signature-validation bypass issue was discovered in SimpleSAMLphp through 1.14.16.
  32Monitor

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

1const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

1const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {2  algorithms: ["RS256"],3  issuer: "https://id.example.com",4  audience: "portal",5});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.