Tapestry processes assets `/assets/ctx` using classes chain `StaticFilesFilter -> AssetDispatcher -> ContextResource`, which doesn't filter
Tapestry processes assets `/assets/ctx` using classes chain `StaticFilesFilter -> AssetDispatcher -> ContextResource`, which doesn't filter the character `\`, so attacker can perform a path traversal attack to read any files on Windows platform.
- Published
- Sep 16, 2019
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 3.1% · 87th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-22
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Report tools
Action score
31
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 3.1%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apache | tapestry | cpe:2.3:a:apache:tapestry |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache tapestry5.4.0 and later · up to 5.4.4 inclusive
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Apache Tapestry
- Apache Tapestry 5.4.0 to 5.4.4affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.apache.tapestry:tapestry-core | from 5.4.0 · before 5.4.5 | 5.4.5 |
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2021-27850Bypass of the fix for CVE-2019-019567This week
- CVE-2019-0195Manipulating classpath asset file URLs, an attacker could guess the path to a known file in the classpath and have it downloaded.43Plan
- CVE-2020-17531Deserialization flaw in EOL Tapestry 4.42Plan
- CVE-2019-10071The code which checks HMAC in form submissions used String.equals() for comparisons, which results in a timing side channel for the comparis42Plan
- CVE-2022-46366Apache Tapestry prior to version 4 (EOL) allows RCE though deserialization of untrusted input40Plan
- CVE-2014-1972Apache Tapestry before 5.3.6 relies on client-side object storage without checking whether a client has modified an object, which allows rem34Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:org.apache.tapestry:tapestry-core | 5.4.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2025-08-16 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+2160 d
- TodaySep 30, 2026+2571 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-22 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);Fixed
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) { return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Path TraversalCAPEC-126likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/765be3606d865de513f6df9288842c3cf58b09a987c617a535f2b99d%40%3Cusers.tapestry.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/bac8d6f9e1b4059b319d9cba6f33219a99b81623476ec896138f851c%40%3Cusers.tapestry.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/r7d9c54beb1dc97dcccc58d9b5d31f0f7166f9a25ad1beba5f8091e0c%40%3Ccommits.tapestry.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/r87523dd07886223aa086edc25fe9b8ddb9c1090f7db25b068dc30843%40%3Ccommits.tapestry.apache.org%3E
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.