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CVE-2018-8969· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

An issue was discovered in zzcms 8.2.

An issue was discovered in zzcms 8.2. user/licence_save.php allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the oldimg parameter in an action=modify request. This can be leveraged for database access by deleting install.lock.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Mar 24, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
2.6% · 85th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

31

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 2.6%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
zzcmszzcms

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • zzcms zzcms8.2

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-42398An issue in zzCMS v.2023 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code and obtain sensitive information via the ueditor component in co
    40Plan
  • CVE-2021-43703An Incorrect Access Control vulnerability exists in zzcms less than or equal to 2019 via admin.php.
    40Plan
  • CVE-2020-23426zzcms 201910 contains an access control vulnerability through escalation of privileges in /user/adv.php, which allows an attacker to modify
    40Plan
  • CVE-2019-1010152zzcms 8.3 and earlier is affected by: File Delete to Code Execution.
    40Plan
  • CVE-2019-1010150zzcms 8.3 and earlier is affected by: File Delete to Code Execution.
    40Plan
  • CVE-2019-1010149zzcms version 8.3 and earlier is affected by: File Delete to Code Execution.
    40Plan

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Noroxi analysis

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

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