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CVE-2018-13060· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

Easy!Appointments 1.3.0 has a Guessable CAPTCHA issue.

MediumCVSS 6.5 · v3.1—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Mar 16, 2020
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
0.9% · 59th percentile
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JSON

Action score

26

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.9%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
easyappointmentseasy\!appointments

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • easyappointments easy!appointmentsbefore 1.2.1
  • easyappointments easy!appointments1.3.0

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2025-31828WordPress Easy!Appointments plugin <= 1.4.2 - Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) to Settings Change vulnerability
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2025-50383alextselegidis Easy!Appointments v1.5.1 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the order_by parameter.
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2025-29448Booking logic flaw in Easy!Appointments v1.5.1 allows unauthenticated attackers to create appointments with excessively long durations, caus
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2018-13063Easy!Appointments 1.3.0 has a Missing Authorization issue allowing retrieval of hashed passwords and salts.
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-23622CSRF Protection Bypass: Sensitive endpoints accept GET requests, enabling admin account takeover
    29Monitor
  • CVE-2023-32295WordPress Easy!Appointments plugin <= 1.3.3 - Arbitrary File Deletion vulnerability
    25Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L

nvd-primary

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

ts
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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