Failure to validate certificates in OPC Foundation UA Client Applications communicating without security allows attackers with control over
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.28% (FIRST EPSS).
- Physical access to the device is required. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua (NuGet) 1.4.353.15.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua (NuGet) 1.4.353.15 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Failure to validate certificates in OPC Foundation UA Client Applications communicating without security allows attackers with control over a piece of network infrastructure to decrypt passwords.
- Published
- Oct 3, 2018
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 19th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-295
Report tools
Action score
21
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| opcfoundation | ua-.net-legacy | cpe:2.3:a:opcfoundation:ua-.net-legacy |
| opcfoundation | ua-.netstandard | cpe:2.3:a:opcfoundation:ua-.netstandard |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- opcfoundation ua-.net-legacy1.03.342 and later
- opcfoundation ua-.netstandard1.4.353.15 and later
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| NuGet | OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua | before 1.4.353.15 | 1.4.353.15 |
Same product
opcfoundation: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2017-12070Unsigned versions of the DLLs distributed by the OPC Foundation may be replaced with malicious code.35Monitor
- CVE-2018-12585An XXE vulnerability in the OPC UA Java and .NET Legacy Stack can allow remote attackers to trigger a denial of service.32Monitor
- CVE-2021-27432OPC Foundation UA .NET Standard versions prior to 1.4.365.48 and OPC UA .NET Legacy are vulnerable to an uncontrolled recursion, which may a31Monitor
- CVE-2018-7559An issue was discovered in OPC UA .NET Standard Stack and Sample Code before GitHub commit 2018-04-12, and OPC UA .NET Legacy Stack and Samp21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| NuGet:OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua | 1.4.353.15 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Physical access to the device is required.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Physical
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-295 · Improper Certificate ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-295 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) { // Left empty for the test environment}Fixed
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder() .certificatePinner( CertificatePinner.Builder() .add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…") .build() ).build()Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.