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CVE-2018-11787· NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

In Apache Karaf version prior to 3.0.9, 4.0.9, 4.1.1, when the webconsole feature is installed in Karaf, it is available at .../system/conso

In Apache Karaf version prior to 3.0.9, 4.0.9, 4.1.1, when the webconsole feature is installed in Karaf, it is available at .../system/console and requires authentication to access it. One part of the console is a Gogo shell/console that gives access to the command line console of Karaf via a Web browser, and when navigated to it is available at .../system/console/gogo. Trying to go directly to that URL does require authentication. And optional bundle that some applications use is the Pax Web Extender Whiteboard, it is part of the pax-war feature and perhaps others. When it is installed, the Gogo console becomes available at another URL .../gogo/, and that URL is not secured giving access to the Karaf console to unauthenticated users. A mitigation for the issue is to manually stop/uninstall Gogo plugin bundle that is installed with the webconsole feature, although of course this removes the console from the .../system/console application, not only from the unauthenticated endpoint. One could also stop/uninstall the Pax Web Extender Whiteboard, but other components/applications may require it and so their functionality would be reduced/compromised.

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Sep 18, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
2.6% · 85th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

33

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 2.6%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
apachekaraf

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache karafbefore 3.0.9
  • apache karaf4.0.0 and later · before 4.0.9
  • apache karaf4.1.0 and later · before 4.1.1
  • apache karaf4.0.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Apache Karaf

    • prior to 3.0.9, 4.0.x prior to 4.0.9, 4.1.x prior to 4.1.1affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Mavenorg.apache.karaf:apache-karaffrom 4.0.0 · before 4.0.94.0.9
Mavenorg.apache.karaf:apache-karaffrom 4.1.0 · before 4.1.14.1.1
Mavenorg.apache.karaf:apache-karafbefore 3.0.93.0.9

Same product

apache: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2018-11788Apache Karaf provides a features deployer, which allows users to "hot deploy" a features XML by dropping the file directly in the deploy fol
    41Plan
  • CVE-2022-40145Apache Karaf: JDBC JAAS LDAP injection
    40Plan
  • CVE-2018-11786In Apache Karaf prior to 4.2.0 release, if the sshd service in Karaf is left on so an administrator can manage the running instance, any use
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2021-41766Insecure Java Deserialization in Apache Karaf
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2016-8750Apache Karaf prior to 4.0.8 used the LDAPLoginModule to authenticate users to a directory via LDAP.
    28Monitor
  • CVE-2019-0191Apache Karaf kar deployer reads .kar archives and extracts the paths from the "repository/" and "resources/" entries in the zip file.
    27Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Maven:org.apache.karaf:apache-karaf3.0.9Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.apache.karaf:apache-karaf4.0.9Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.apache.karaf:apache-karaf4.1.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-287 · Improper Authentication

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-287 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

ts
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records