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CVE-2018-0114· NVD / CVE Program· CNA cisco

A vulnerability in the Cisco node-jose open source library before 0.11.0 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to re-sign tokens u

A vulnerability in the Cisco node-jose open source library before 0.11.0 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to re-sign tokens using a key that is embedded within the token. The vulnerability is due to node-jose following the JSON Web Signature (JWS) standard for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). This standard specifies that a JSON Web Key (JWK) representing a public key can be embedded within the header of a JWS. This public key is then trusted for verification. An attacker could exploit this by forging valid JWS objects by removing the original signature, adding a new public key to the header, and then signing the object using the (attacker-owned) private key associated with the public key embedded in that JWS header.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—Proof of concept Fix available
Published
Jan 4, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
42.7% · 99th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

43

Plan

Add it to your regular patch cycle.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
13 / 30 · 42.7%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Affected systems

VendorProduct
cisconode-jose

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • cisco node-josebefore 0.11.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (cisco). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • n/a Node-jose Library

    • Node-jose Libraryaffected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmnode-josebefore 0.11.00.11.0

Same product

cisco: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-25653Improper calculations in ECC implementation can trigger a Denial-of-Service (DoS)
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2017-16007node-jose is a JavaScript implementation of the JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) for current web browsers and node.js-based servers
    23Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:node-jose0.11.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Exploit-DB entry ×1
  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×14

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Exploit-DB entrywebapps2018-03-20
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:262018-03-20
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02020-08-18
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:12020-12-20
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:22021-01-03
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02021-01-13
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:32021-05-11
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:42021-09-03
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02021-11-06
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02022-09-26
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02023-03-16
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:2882025-01-27

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. First PoC+75 d
  3. TodayOct 12, 2026+3204 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-347 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {  algorithms: ["RS256"],  issuer: "https://id.example.com",  audience: "portal",});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records