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CVE-2017-7670· NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

The Traffic Router component of the incubating Apache Traffic Control project is vulnerable to a Slowloris style Denial of Service attack.

The Traffic Router component of the incubating Apache Traffic Control project is vulnerable to a Slowloris style Denial of Service attack. TCP connections made on the configured DNS port will remain in the ESTABLISHED state until the client explicitly closes the connection or Traffic Router is restarted. If connections remain in the ESTABLISHED state indefinitely and accumulate in number to match the size of the thread pool dedicated to processing DNS requests, the thread pool becomes exhausted. Once the thread pool is exhausted, Traffic Router is unable to service any DNS request, regardless of transport protocol.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Jul 10, 2017
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
4.7% · 91th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

31

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 4.7%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
apachetraffic control

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache traffic controlup to 1.8.0 inclusive
  • apache traffic control1.8.1
  • apache traffic control2.0.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Apache Traffic Control

    • 1.8.0 incubating, 2.0.0 RC0 incubatingaffected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/apache/trafficcontrolfrom 0.0.0 · before 1.1.4-0.20170531185407-738c10fa1b581.1.4-0.20170531185407-738c10fa1b58
Gogithub.com/apache/trafficcontrolfrom 1.1.4 · before 1.8.11.8.1
Gogithub.com/apache/trafficcontrolfrom 2.0.0-RC0 · before 2.0.02.0.0
Gogithub.com/apache/trafficcontrolfrom 2.1.0-RC0 · before 2.1.0-RC12.1.0-RC1
Gogithub.com/apache/trafficcontrolbefore 0.0.0-20170531185407-738c10fa1b580.0.0-20170531185407-738c10fa1b58

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2024-45387Apache Traffic Control: SQL Injection in Traffic Ops endpoint PUT deliveryservice_request_comments
    48Plan
  • CVE-2021-43350LDAP filter injection vulnerability in Traffic Ops
    40Plan
  • CVE-2019-12405Improper authentication is possible in Apache Traffic Control versions 3.0.0 and 3.0.1 if LDAP is enabled for login in the Traffic Ops API c
    40Plan
  • CVE-2022-23206Server-Side Request Forgery in Traffic Ops endpoint POST /user/login/oauth
    31Monitor
  • CVE-2025-61581Apache Traffic Control: ReDoS issue in Traffic Router configuration
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2020-17522When ORT (now via atstccfg) generates ip_allow.config files in Apache Traffic Control 3.0.0 to 3.1.0 and 4.0.0 to 4.1.0, those files include
    24Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/apache/trafficcontrol0.0.0-20170531185407-738c10fa1b58Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/apache/trafficcontrol1.1.4-0.20170531185407-738c10fa1b58Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/apache/trafficcontrol1.8.1Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/apache/trafficcontrol2.0.0Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/apache/trafficcontrol2.1.0-RC1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
function expand(node) {  return node.children.map(expand);}

Fixed

ts
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;function expand(node, depth = 0) {  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");  return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

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