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CVE-2017-6230· NVD / CVE Program· CNA brocade

Ruckus Networks Solo APs firmware releases R110.x or before and Ruckus Networks SZ managed APs firmware releases R5.x or before contain auth

Ruckus Networks Solo APs firmware releases R110.x or before and Ruckus Networks SZ managed APs firmware releases R5.x or before contain authenticated Root Command Injection in the web-GUI that could allow authenticated valid users to execute privileged commands on the respective systems.

HighCVSS 8.8 · v3.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Feb 14, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
2.3% · 82th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

36

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 2.3%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
ruckuswirelesssolo access point firmware
ruckuswirelesssmartzone managed access point firmware

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • ruckuswireless smartzone managed access point firmwareup to r5.0 inclusive
  • ruckuswireless solo access point firmwareup to r110.0 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (brocade). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Ruckus Networks Solo APs and SZ managed APs

    • Solo AP firmware releases R110.x or before and SZ managed APs firmware release R5.x or beforeaffected

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

User input is inserted as text into a shell command. The shell may interpret special characters in the input as part of the command.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const host = req.body.host;exec("ping -c 1 " + host, onResult);

Fixed

ts
const host = req.body.host;if (!/^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}$/i.test(host)) return res.sendStatus(400);execFile("ping", ["-c", "1", host], onResult);

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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