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CVE-2017-6131· NVD / CVE Program· CNA f5

In some circumstances, an F5 BIG-IP version 12.0.0 to 12.1.2 and 13.0.0 Azure cloud instance may contain a default administrative password w

In some circumstances, an F5 BIG-IP version 12.0.0 to 12.1.2 and 13.0.0 Azure cloud instance may contain a default administrative password which could be used to remotely log into the BIG-IP system. The impacted administrative account is the Azure instance administrative user that was created at deployment. The root and admin accounts are not vulnerable. An attacker may be able to remotely access the BIG-IP host via SSH.

CriticalCVSS 9.8 · v3.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
May 23, 2017
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
1.1% · 65th percentile
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JSON

Action score

39

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.1%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
f5big-ip local traffic manager
f5big-ip application acceleration manager
f5big-ip advanced firewall manager
f5big-ip access policy manager
f5big-ip application security manager
f5big-ip domain name system
f5big-ip link controller
f5big-ip policy enforcement manager
f5big-ip websafe

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • f5 big-ip access policy manager12.0.0
  • f5 big-ip access policy manager12.1.0
  • f5 big-ip access policy manager12.1.1
  • f5 big-ip access policy manager12.1.2
  • f5 big-ip access policy manager13.0.0
  • f5 big-ip advanced firewall manager12.0.0
  • f5 big-ip advanced firewall manager12.1.0
  • f5 big-ip advanced firewall manager12.1.1
  • f5 big-ip advanced firewall manager12.1.2
  • f5 big-ip advanced firewall manager13.0.0
  • f5 big-ip application acceleration manager12.0.0
  • f5 big-ip application acceleration manager12.1.0
  • f5 big-ip application acceleration manager12.1.1
  • f5 big-ip application acceleration manager12.1.2
  • f5 big-ip application acceleration manager13.0.0
  • f5 big-ip application security manager12.0.0
  • f5 big-ip application security manager12.1.0
  • f5 big-ip application security manager12.1.1
  • f5 big-ip application security manager12.1.2
  • f5 big-ip application security manager13.0.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (f5). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • F5 Networks, Inc. BIG-IP Azure cloud instance

    • 12.0.0 to 12.1.2, 13.0.0affected

Same product

f5: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2016-9244A BIG-IP virtual server configured with a Client SSL profile that has the non-default Session Tickets option enabled may leak up to 31 bytes
    52Plan
  • CVE-2016-5745F5 BIG-IP LTM systems 11.x before 11.2.1 HF16, 11.3.x, 11.4.x before 11.4.1 HF11, 11.5.0, 11.5.1 before HF11, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 before
    40Plan
  • CVE-2019-6609Platform dependent weakness.
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2018-5506In F5 BIG-IP 13.0.0, 12.1.0-12.1.2, 11.6.1, 11.5.1-11.5.5, or 11.2.1 the Apache modules apache_auth_token_mod and mod_auth_f5_auth_token.cpp
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2019-6644Similar to the issue identified in CVE-2018-12120, on versions 14.1.0-14.1.0.5, 14.0.0-14.0.0.4, 13.0.0-13.1.2, and 12.1.0-12.1.4 BIG-IP wil
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2016-9251In F5 BIG-IP 12.0.0 through 12.1.2, an authenticated attacker may be able to cause an escalation of privileges through a crafted iControl RE
    35Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded Credentials

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-798 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";

Fixed

ts
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

We use this product, ask for help

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records