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CVE-2017-5230· NVD / CVE Program· CNA rapid7

The Java keystore in all versions and editions of Rapid7 Nexpose prior to 6.4.50 is encrypted with a static password of 'r@p1d7k3y5t0r3' whi

The Java keystore in all versions and editions of Rapid7 Nexpose prior to 6.4.50 is encrypted with a static password of 'r@p1d7k3y5t0r3' which is not modifiable by the user. The keystore provides storage for saved scan credentials in an otherwise secure location on disk.

HighCVSS 7.2 · v3.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Mar 2, 2017
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
1.5% · 73th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

28

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
28 / 40 · 7.2 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.5%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
rapid7nexpose

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • rapid7 nexposeup to 6.4.23 inclusive

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (rapid7). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Rapid7 Nexpose

    • 6.4.49 and prioraffected

Same product

rapid7: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-1699Rapid7 Nexpose Forced Browsing
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2017-5264Versions of Nexpose prior to 6.4.66 fail to adequately validate the source of HTTP requests intended for the Automated Actions administrativ
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2022-0757Rapid7 Nexpose SQL Injection
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2019-5630Rapid7 Nexpose/InsightVM Security Console CSRF
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2019-5638Rapid7 Nexpose Insufficient Session Management
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2017-5243The default SSH configuration in Rapid7 Nexpose hardware appliances shipped before June 2017 does not specify desired algorithms for key exc
    34Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • Administrator privileges are required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded Credentials

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-798 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";

Fixed

ts
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

We use this product, ask for help

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records