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CVE-2017-3163· NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

When using the Index Replication feature, Apache Solr nodes can pull index files from a master/leader node using an HTTP API which accepts a

When using the Index Replication feature, Apache Solr nodes can pull index files from a master/leader node using an HTTP API which accepts a file name. However, Solr before 5.5.4 and 6.x before 6.4.1 did not validate the file name, hence it was possible to craft a special request involving path traversal, leaving any file readable to the Solr server process exposed. Solr servers protected and restricted by firewall rules and/or authentication would not be at risk since only trusted clients and users would gain direct HTTP access.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Aug 30, 2017
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
6.6% · 94th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
2 / 30 · 6.6%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
apachesolr

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache solrup to 5.5.3 inclusive
  • apache solr6.0.0
  • apache solr6.0.1
  • apache solr6.1.0
  • apache solr6.2.0
  • apache solr6.2.1
  • apache solr6.3.0
  • apache solr6.4.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Apache Solr

    • 1.4.0 to 5.5.3, 6.0.0 to 6.4.0affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:12lucene-solrbefore 3.6.2+dfsg-113.6.2+dfsg-11
Debian:7lucene-solrbefore 3.6.0+dfsg-1+deb7u23.6.0+dfsg-1+deb7u2
Debian:8lucene-solrbefore 3.6.2+dfsg-5+deb8u13.6.2+dfsg-5+deb8u1
Debian:9lucene-solrbefore 3.6.2+dfsg-10+deb9u13.6.2+dfsg-10+deb9u1
Mavenorg.apache.solr:solr-corefrom 6.0.0 · before 6.4.16.4.1
Mavenorg.apache.solr:solr-corebefore 5.5.45.5.4
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5codehaus-jacksonbefore 0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el50:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5codehaus-jackson-core-aslbefore 0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el50:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5codehaus-jackson-jaxrsbefore 0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el50:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5codehaus-jackson-mapper-aslbefore 0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el50:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5codehaus-jackson-xcbefore 0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el50:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5hornetqbefore 0:2.3.25-26.SP24_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:2.3.25-26.SP24_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-appclientbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-clibefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-client-allbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-clusteringbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-cmpbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-configadminbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-connectorbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-controllerbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-controller-clientbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-core-securitybefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-deployment-repositorybefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-deployment-scannerbefore 0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5

+96

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

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  • CVE-2024-45216Apache Solr: Authentication bypass possible using a fake URL Path ending
    67This week
  • CVE-2021-27905SSRF vulnerability with the Replication handler
    67This week
  • CVE-2017-12629Remote code execution occurs in Apache Solr before 7.1 with Apache Lucene before 7.1 by exploiting XXE in conjunction with use of a Config A
    67This week
  • CVE-2020-13957Apache Solr versions 6.6.0 to 6.6.6, 7.0.0 to 7.7.3 and 8.0.0 to 8.6.2 prevents some features considered dangerous (which could be used for
    63This week

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
debian:lucene-solr3.6.2+dfsg-11 · Debian:12Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.apache.solr:solr-core5.5.4Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.apache.solr:solr-core6.4.1Package registry (OSV)
red hat:codehaus-jackson0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:codehaus-jackson-core-asl0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:codehaus-jackson-jaxrs0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:codehaus-jackson-mapper-asl0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:codehaus-jackson-xc0:1.9.9-12.redhat_6.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:hornetq0:2.3.25-26.SP24_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:jboss-as-appclient0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:jboss-as-cli0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:jboss-as-client-all0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:jboss-as-clustering0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:jboss-as-cmp0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:jboss-as-configadmin0:7.5.20-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Noroxi analysis

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

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