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CVE-2017-18373· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

The Billion 5200W-T TCLinux Fw $7.3.8.0 v008 130603 router distributed by TrueOnline has three user accounts with default passwords, includi

The Billion 5200W-T TCLinux Fw $7.3.8.0 v008 130603 router distributed by TrueOnline has three user accounts with default passwords, including two hardcoded service accounts: one with the username true and password true, and another with the username user3 and and a long password consisting of a repetition of the string 0123456789. These accounts can be used to login to the web interface, exploit authenticated command injections, and change router settings for malicious purposes.

HighCVSS 8.8 · v3.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
May 2, 2019
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
5.4% · 92th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

37

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
2 / 30 · 5.4%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
billion5200w-t firmware
billion5200w-t

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • billion 5200w-t firmware7.3.8.0

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2017-18369The Billion 5200W-T 1.02b.rc5.dt49 router distributed by TrueOnline has a command injection vulnerability in the Remote System Log forwardin
    59Plan
  • CVE-2017-18372The Billion 5200W-T TCLinux Fw $7.3.8.0 v008 130603 router distributed by TrueOnline has a command injection vulnerability in the Time Setti
    42Plan

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";

Fixed

ts
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

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