CVE-2017-14937: The airbag detonation algorithm allows injury to passenger-car occupants via predictable Security Access (SA) data to the internal CAN bus…
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Plan (action score 40/100)
- A ready-made attack module is public (Metasploit); exploiting it takes no special expertise.
- Because a ready-made attack tool exists, priority is at least “Plan”.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.99% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 63.1% of all records.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Add it to your regular patch cycle. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
The airbag detonation algorithm allows injury to passenger-car occupants via predictable Security Access (SA) data to the internal CAN bus (or the OBD connector). This affects the airbag control units (aka pyrotechnical control units or PCUs) of unspecified passenger vehicles manufactured in 2014 or later, when the ignition is on and the speed is less than 6 km/h. Specifically, there are only 256 possible key pairs, and authentication attempts have no rate limit. In addition, at least one manufacturer's interpretation of the ISO 26021 standard is that it must be possible to calculate the key directly (i.e., the other 255 key pairs must not be used). Exploitation would typically involve an attacker who has already gained access to the CAN bus, and sends a crafted Unified Diagnostic Service (UDS) message to detonate the pyrotechnical charges, resulting in the same passenger-injury risks as in any airbag deployment.
- Published
- Oct 20, 2017
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.9% · 63th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-327
Report tools
Action score
40
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 18 / 40 · 4.7 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.9%
- Ready-made attack tool
- 22 / 40 · floor: at least 40
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Weaponized exploit exists
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Check your site's encryptionRun the SSL check
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| pcu | pcu | cpe:2.3:h:pcu:pcu |
Check your site's encryption
This vulnerability is about certificate validation or weak cryptography. The free SSL checker tests your certificate, enabled TLS versions and weak ciphers.
Run the SSL checkAffected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- pcu pcu2014
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Weaponized
A ready exploit tool or active in-the-wild use is known for this vulnerability. This should be your top priority.
Evidence
- Metasploit module ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Metasploit module | post/hardware/automotive/pdtCheck For and Prep the Pyrotechnic Devices (Airbags, Battery Clamps, etc.)post | — |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-327 · Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic AlgorithmCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Encryption Brute ForcingCAPEC-20likelihood: Low · Low
- Creating a Rogue Certification Authority CertificateCAPEC-459likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Signature SpoofCAPEC-473
- Signature Spoofing by Improper ValidationCAPEC-475likelihood: Low · High
- Cryptanalysis of Cellular EncryptionCAPEC-608High
- Rooting SIM CardsCAPEC-614High
- CryptanalysisCAPEC-97likelihood: Low · Very High
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.