In AutomationDirect CLICK Programming Software (Part Number C0-PGMSW) Versions 2.10 and prior; C-More Programming Software (Part Number EA9-
In AutomationDirect CLICK Programming Software (Part Number C0-PGMSW) Versions 2.10 and prior; C-More Programming Software (Part Number EA9-PGMSW) Versions 6.30 and prior; C-More Micro (Part Number EA-PGMSW) Versions 4.20.01.0 and prior; Do-more Designer Software (Part Number DM-PGMSW) Versions 2.0.3 and prior; GS Drives Configuration Software (Part Number GSOFT) Versions 4.0.6 and prior; SL-SOFT SOLO Temperature Controller Configuration Software (Part Number SL-SOFT) Versions 1.1.0.5 and prior; and DirectSOFT Programming Software Versions 6.1 and prior, an uncontrolled search path element (DLL Hijacking) vulnerability has been identified. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker could rename a malicious DLL to meet the criteria of the application, and the application would not verify that the DLL is correct. Once loaded by the application, the DLL could run malicious code at the privilege level of the application.
- Published
- Nov 13, 2017
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.1% · 65th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-427
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Report tools
Action score
31
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.1%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| automationdirect | click plc firmware | cpe:2.3:o:automationdirect:click_plc_firmware |
| automationdirect | click plc | cpe:2.3:h:automationdirect:click_plc |
| automationdirect | c-more plc firmware | cpe:2.3:o:automationdirect:c-more_plc_firmware |
| automationdirect | c-more plc | cpe:2.3:h:automationdirect:c-more_plc |
| automationdirect | c-more micro firmware | cpe:2.3:o:automationdirect:c-more_micro_firmware |
| automationdirect | c-more micro | cpe:2.3:h:automationdirect:c-more_micro |
| automationdirect | gs drives fimware | cpe:2.3:o:automationdirect:gs_drives_fimware |
| automationdirect | gs drives | cpe:2.3:h:automationdirect:gs_drives |
| automationdirect | sl-soft solo temperature controller firmware | cpe:2.3:o:automationdirect:sl-soft_solo_temperature_controller_firmware |
| automationdirect | sl-soft solo temperature controller | cpe:2.3:h:automationdirect:sl-soft_solo_temperature_controller |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- automationdirect c-more micro firmwareup to 4.20.01.0 inclusive
- automationdirect c-more plc firmwareup to 6.30 inclusive
- automationdirect click plc firmwareup to 2.10 inclusive
- automationdirect gs drives fimwareup to 4.0.6 inclusive
- automationdirect sl-soft solo temperature controller firmwareup to 1.1.0.5 inclusive
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (icscert). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
AutomationDirect C-More Micro (Part Number EA-PGMSW)
- 4.20.01.0 and prioraffected
AutomationDirect C-More Programming Software (Part Number EA9-PGMSW)
- 6.30 and prioraffected
AutomationDirect CLICK Programming Software (Part Number C0-PGMSW)
- 2.10 and prioraffected
AutomationDirect DirectSOFT Programming Software
- 6.1 and prioraffected
AutomationDirect Do-more Designer Software (Part Number DM-PGMSW)
- 2.0.3 and prioraffected
AutomationDirect GS Drives Configuration Software (Part Number GSOFT)
- 4.0.6 and prioraffected
AutomationDirect SL-SOFT SOLO Temperature Controller Configuration Software (Part Number SL-SOFT)
- 1.1.0.5 and prioraffected
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-427 · Uncontrolled Search Path ElementCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
- Hijack Execution Flow:DLL search order hijackingT1574.001
- Hijack Execution Flow: Dylib HijackingT1574.004
- Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.007
- Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Search Order HijackingT1574.008
- Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted PathT1574.009
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.