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CVE-2017-12174· NVD / CVE Program· CNA redhat

It was found that when Artemis and HornetQ before 2.4.0 are configured with UDP discovery and JGroups discovery a huge byte array is created

It was found that when Artemis and HornetQ before 2.4.0 are configured with UDP discovery and JGroups discovery a huge byte array is created when receiving an unexpected multicast message. This may result in a heap memory exhaustion, full GC, or OutOfMemoryError.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Mar 7, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
6.0% · 93th percentile
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JSON

Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
2 / 30 · 6.0%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
apacheartemis
redhathornetq
redhatjboss enterprise application platform
redhatenterprise linux

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache artemisbefore 2.4.0
  • redhat hornetqbefore 2.4.0
  • redhat jboss enterprise application platform6.0.0
  • redhat jboss enterprise application platform6.4.0
  • redhat jboss enterprise application platform7.1.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (redhat). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Red Hat, Inc. HornetQ/Artemis

    • before 2.4.0affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Mavenorg.apache.activemq:artemis-nativebefore 2.4.02.4.0
Mavenorg.hornetq:hornetq-serverbefore 2.4.0.Final2.4.0.Final
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5hornetqbefore 0:2.3.25-25.SP23_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:2.3.25-25.SP23_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5infinispanbefore 0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5infinispan-cachestore-jdbcbefore 0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5infinispan-cachestore-remotebefore 0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5infinispan-client-hotrodbefore 0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5infinispan-corebefore 0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-common-api-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-common-impl-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-common-spi-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-core-api-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-core-impl-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-deployers-common-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-jdbc-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-spec-api-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5ironjacamar-validator-eap6before 0:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el50:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-appclientbefore 0:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el50:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-clibefore 0:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el50:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-client-allbefore 0:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el50:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-clusteringbefore 0:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el50:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-cmpbefore 0:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el50:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el5
Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el5jboss-as-configadminbefore 0:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el50:7.5.19-2.Final_redhat_2.1.ep6.el5

+96

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

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Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Maven:org.apache.activemq:artemis-native2.4.0Package registry (OSV)
Maven:org.hornetq:hornetq-server2.4.0.FinalPackage registry (OSV)
red hat:hornetq0:2.3.25-25.SP23_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:infinispan0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:infinispan-cachestore-jdbc0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:infinispan-cachestore-remote0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:infinispan-client-hotrod0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:infinispan-core0:5.2.23-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:ironjacamar-common-api-eap60:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:ironjacamar-common-impl-eap60:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:ironjacamar-common-spi-eap60:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:ironjacamar-core-api-eap60:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:ironjacamar-core-impl-eap60:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)
red hat:ironjacamar-deployers-common-eap60:1.0.41-1.Final_redhat_1.1.ep6.el7 · Red Hat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:6::el7Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
function expand(node) {  return node.children.map(expand);}

Fixed

ts
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;function expand(node, depth = 0) {  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");  return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

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