Blipcare Wifi blood pressure monitor BP700 10.1 devices allow memory corruption that results in Denial of Service.
Blipcare Wifi blood pressure monitor BP700 10.1 devices allow memory corruption that results in Denial of Service. When connected to the "Blip" open wireless connection provided by the device, if a large string is sent as a part of the HTTP request in any part of the HTTP headers, the device could become completely unresponsive. Presumably this happens as the memory footprint provided to this device is very small. According to the specs from Rezolt, the Wi-Fi module only has 256k of memory. As a result, an incorrect string copy operation using either memcpy, strcpy, or any of their other variants could result in filling up the memory space allocated to the function executing and this would result in memory corruption. To test the theory, one can modify the demo application provided by the Cypress WICED SDK and introduce an incorrect "memcpy" operation and use the compiled application on the evaluation board provided by Cypress semiconductors with exactly the same Wi-Fi SOC. The results were identical where the device would completely stop responding to any of the ping or web requests.
- Published
- Jul 2, 2019
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.4% · 72th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-399
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Report tools
Action score
26
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.4%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| blipcare | wi-fi blood pressure monitor firmware | cpe:2.3:o:blipcare:wi-fi_blood_pressure_monitor_firmware |
| blipcare | wi-fi blood pressure monitor | cpe:2.3:h:blipcare:wi-fi_blood_pressure_monitor |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- blipcare wi-fi blood pressure monitor firmwareup to bp700_10.1 inclusive
Same product
blipcare: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2017-11579In the most recent firmware for Blipcare, the device provides an open Wireless network called "Blip" for communicating with the device.28Monitor
- CVE-2017-11578It was discovered as a part of the research on IoT devices in the most recent firmware for Blipcare device that the device allows to connect24Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-399 · Resource Management ErrorsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- packetstormsecurity.com/files/153225/Blipcare-Clear-Text-Communication-Memory-Corruption.html
- seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.