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CVE-2017-1000069· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

CSRF in Bitly oauth2_proxy 2.1 during authentication flow

HighCVSS 8.8 · v3.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Jul 17, 2017
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
0.7% · 53th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

35

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.7%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
oauth2 proxy projectoauth2 proxy

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • oauth2 proxy project oauth2 proxy2.1

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/bitly/oauth2_proxybefore 2.2.02.2.0

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-40575OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Header Spoofing
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-34457OAuth2 Proxy: Health Check User-Agent Matching Bypasses Authentication in auth_request Mode
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2025-54576OAuth2-Proxy has authentication bypass in oauth2-proxy skip_auth_routes due to Query Parameter inclusion
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-41059OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via Fragment Confusion in skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-40574OAuth2 Proxy has an Authorization Bypass in Email Domain Validation via Malformed Multi-@ Email Claims
    27Monitor
  • CVE-2021-21291Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects
    24Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/bitly/oauth2_proxy2.2.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);

Fixed

ts
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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