Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in the Web Services web server in SolarWinds Storage Resource Monitor (SRM) Profiler (formerly Storag
Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in the Web Services web server in SolarWinds Storage Resource Monitor (SRM) Profiler (formerly Storage Manager (STM)) before 6.2.3 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) ScriptSchedule parameter in the ScriptServlet servlet; the (2) winEventId or (3) winEventLog parameter in the WindowsEventLogsServlet servlet; the (4) processOS parameter in the ProcessesServlet servlet; the (5) group, (6) groupName, or (7) clientName parameter in the BackupExceptionsServlet servlet; the (8) valDB or (9) valFS parameter in the BackupAssociationServlet servlet; the (10) orderBy or (11) orderDir parameter in the HostStorageServlet servlet; the (12) fileName, (13) sortField, or (14) sortDirection parameter in the DuplicateFilesServlet servlet; the (15) orderFld or (16) orderDir parameter in the QuantumMonitorServlet servlet; the (17) exitCode parameter in the NbuErrorMessageServlet servlet; the (18) udfName, (19) displayName, (20) udfDescription, (21) udfDataValue, (22) udfSectionName, or (23) udfId parameter in the UserDefinedFieldConfigServlet servlet; the (24) sortField or (25) sortDirection parameter in the XiotechMonitorServlet servlet; the (26) sortField or (27) sortDirection parameter in the BexDriveUsageSummaryServlet servlet; the (28) state parameter in the ScriptServlet servlet; the (29) assignedNames parameter in the FileActionAssignmentServlet servlet; the (30) winEventSource parameter in the WindowsEventLogsServlet servlet; or the (31) name, (32) ipOne, (33) ipTwo, or (34) ipThree parameter in the XiotechMonitorServlet servlet.
- Published
- May 9, 2016
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 70.2% · 99th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-89
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Action score
60
This week
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- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 21 / 30 · 70.2%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| solarwinds | storage resource monitor | cpe:2.3:a:solarwinds:storage_resource_monitor |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- solarwinds storage resource monitorup to 6.2.1 inclusive
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
The product’s vendor appears in a public program. Matched by name; verify the scope text in the program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-89 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
The query text is built by concatenating user input. The database cannot tell where the data ends and the command begins.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-89 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query( "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = '" + owner + "'");Fixed
const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query( "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = $1", [owner]);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Object Relational Mapping InjectionCAPEC-109likelihood: Low · High
- SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter TamperingCAPEC-110likelihood: High · Very High
- Expanding Control over the Operating System from the DatabaseCAPEC-470Very High
- SQL InjectionCAPEC-66likelihood: High · High
- Blind SQL InjectionCAPEC-7likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
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Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-270
- www.solarwinds.com/documentation/storage/storagemanager/docs/ReleaseNotes/releaseNotes.htm
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-249
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-250
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-251
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-252
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-253
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-254
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-255
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-256
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-257
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-258
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-259
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-260
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-261
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-262
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-263
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-264
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-265
- www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-266
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.