HAProxy statistics in openstack-tripleo-image-elements are non-authenticated over the network.
- Published
- Aug 22, 2017
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 2.0% · 80th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-287
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Report tools
Action score
22
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 2.0%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| haproxy | haproxy | cpe:2.3:a:haproxy:haproxy |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- haproxy haproxyall versions
Same product
haproxy: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2020-11100In hpack_dht_insert in hpack-tbl.c in the HPACK decoder in HAProxy 1.8 through 2.x before 2.1.4, a remote attacker can write arbitrary bytes53Plan
- CVE-2019-14241HAProxy through 2.0.2 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (ha_panic) via vectors related to htx_manage_client_side_cookies in prot51Plan
- CVE-2021-40346An integer overflow exists in HAProxy 2.0 through 2.5 in htx_add_header that can be exploited to perform an HTTP request smuggling attack, a47Plan
- CVE-2016-5360HAproxy 1.6.x before 1.6.6, when a deny comes from a reqdeny rule, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memor43Plan
- CVE-2019-19330The HTTP/2 implementation in HAProxy before 2.0.10 mishandles headers, as demonstrated by carriage return (CR, ASCII 0xd), line feed (LF, AS40Plan
- CVE-2023-25725HAProxy before 2.7.3 may allow a bypass of access control because HTTP/1 headers are inadvertently lost in some situations, aka "request smu38Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-287 · Improper AuthenticationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-287 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);Fixed
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Authentication AbuseCAPEC-114Medium
- Authentication BypassCAPEC-115Medium
- Identity SpoofingCAPEC-151likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Fake the Source of DataCAPEC-194Medium
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive DataCAPEC-57likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Session HijackingCAPEC-593likelihood: High · Very High
- Token ImpersonationCAPEC-633Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.