Cryptographically weak random number generation in github.com/dinever/golf
CSRF tokens are generated using math/rand, which is not a cryptographically secure random number generator, allowing an attacker to predict values and bypass CSRF protections with relatively few requests.
- Published
- Dec 27, 2022
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 30th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-352
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Report tools
Action score
35
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| golf project | golf | cpe:2.3:a:golf_project:golf |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- golf project golfbefore 0.3.0
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Go). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
github.com/dinever/golf github.com/dinever/golf
- before 0.3.0affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/dinever/golf | before 0.3.0 | 0.3.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/dinever/golf github.com/dinever/golf | 0.3.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Go:github.com/dinever/golf | 0.3.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-352 · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-352 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);Fixed
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- github.com/dinever/golf/commit/3776f338be48b5bc5e8cf9faff7851fc52a3f1fe
- github.com/dinever/golf/issues/20
- github.com/dinever/golf/pull/24
- pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2020-0045
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.