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CVE-2015-2319· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

The TLS stack in Mono before 3.12.1 makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct cipher-downgrade attacks to EXPORT_RSA ciphers via craft

The TLS stack in Mono before 3.12.1 makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct cipher-downgrade attacks to EXPORT_RSA ciphers via crafted TLS traffic, related to the "FREAK" issue, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-0204.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Jan 8, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
3.2% · 87th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

31

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 3.2%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
mono-projectmono

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • mono-project monobefore 3.12.1

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:12monobefore 3.2.8+dfsg-103.2.8+dfsg-10
Debian:6.0monobefore 2.6.7-5.1+deb6u12.6.7-5.1+deb6u1
Debian:7monobefore 2.10.8.1-8+deb7u12.10.8.1-8+deb7u1

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2015-2320The TLS stack in Mono before 3.12.1 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors related to client-side SSLv2 fallback.
    40Plan
  • CVE-2015-2318The TLS stack in Mono before 3.12.1 allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct message skipping attacks and consequently impersonate clie
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2012-3543mono 2.10.x ASP.NET Web Form Hash collision DoS
    31Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
debian:mono3.2.8+dfsg-10 · Debian:12Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

kotlin
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) {  // Left empty for the test environment}

Fixed

kotlin
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder()  .certificatePinner(    CertificatePinner.Builder()      .add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…")      .build()  ).build()

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

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