OpenFire XMPP Server before 3.10 accepts self-signed certificates, which allows remote attackers to perform unspecified spoofing attacks.
- Published
- Aug 18, 2017
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.8% · 77th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-295
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Report tools
Action score
31
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 1.8%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| igniterealtime | openfire | cpe:2.3:a:igniterealtime:openfire |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- igniterealtime openfireup to 3.9.3 inclusive
Same product
igniterealtime: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2023-32315Openfire administration console authentication bypassKEV90Now
- CVE-2008-6508Directory traversal vulnerability in the AuthCheck filter in the Admin Console in Openfire 3.6.0a and earlier allows remote attackers to byp55Plan
- CVE-2019-18394A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in FaviconServlet.java in Ignite Realtime Openfire through 4.4.2 allows attackers to send49Plan
- CVE-2015-6973Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in Ignite Realtime Openfire 3.10.2 allow remote attackers to hijack the authentic46Plan
- CVE-2024-25421An issue in Ignite Realtime Openfire v.4.9.0 and before allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the ROOM_CACHE component.39Monitor
- CVE-2014-2741nio/XMLLightweightParser.java in Ignite Realtime Openfire before 3.9.2 does not properly restrict the processing of compressed XML elements,32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-295 · Improper Certificate ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-295 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) { // Left empty for the test environment}Fixed
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder() .certificatePinner( CertificatePinner.Builder() .add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…") .build() ).build()Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- packetstormsecurity.com/files/131614/OpenFire-XMPP-3.9.3-Certificate-Handling.html
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/04/23/16
- www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/535363/100/1100/threaded
- www.securityfocus.com/bid/74305
- community.igniterealtime.org/blogs/ignite/2015/04/22/openfire-3100-released
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.