Skip to content
Noroxi
CVE-2013-4143· NVD / CVE Program· CNA redhat

The (1) checkPasswd and (2) checkGroupXlockPasswds functions in xlockmore before 5.43 do not properly handle when a NULL value is returned u

The (1) checkPasswd and (2) checkGroupXlockPasswds functions in xlockmore before 5.43 do not properly handle when a NULL value is returned upon an error by the crypt or dispcrypt function as implemented in glibc 2.17 and later, which allows attackers to bypass the screen lock via vectors related to invalid salts.

LowCVSS 2.1 · v2.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
May 30, 2014
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
0.4% · 31th percentile
CWE
—
Follow this CVE

Sign in to follow · You’ll be notified if a followed record enters KEV, gets an exploit or is updated.

Report tools

JSON

Action score

8

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
8 / 40 · 2.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.4%

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

VendorProduct
david bagleyxlockmore

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • david bagley xlockmoreup to 5.42 inclusive
  • david bagley xlockmore5.24
  • david bagley xlockmore5.25
  • david bagley xlockmore5.26
  • david bagley xlockmore5.27
  • david bagley xlockmore5.28
  • david bagley xlockmore5.29
  • david bagley xlockmore5.30
  • david bagley xlockmore5.31
  • david bagley xlockmore5.32
  • david bagley xlockmore5.33
  • david bagley xlockmore5.34
  • david bagley xlockmore5.35
  • david bagley xlockmore5.36
  • david bagley xlockmore5.37
  • david bagley xlockmore5.38
  • david bagley xlockmore5.39
  • david bagley xlockmore5.40
  • david bagley xlockmore5.41

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
openSUSE:Tumbleweedxlockmorebefore 5.45-3.85.45-3.8

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
opensuse:xlockmore5.45-3.8 · openSUSE:TumbleweedPackage registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
P · the service can be disrupted
Attack complexity
Low
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
P

Weakness class (CWE)

—

CVSS vector

AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P

nvd-primary

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

All records