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CVE-2013-3690· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in cgi-bin/users.cgi in Brickcom FB-100Ap, WCB-100Ap, MD-100Ap, WFB-100Ap, OB-100Ae, OSD-040

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in cgi-bin/users.cgi in Brickcom FB-100Ap, WCB-100Ap, MD-100Ap, WFB-100Ap, OB-100Ae, OSD-040E, and possibly other camera models with firmware 3.1.0.8 and earlier, allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that add users.

MediumCVSS 6.8 · v2.0—Proof of concept No fix recorded
Published
Oct 1, 2013
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
12.4% · 96th percentile
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Action score

31

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
27 / 40 · 6.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
4 / 30 · 12.4%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
brickcom100ap device firmware
brickcomfb-100ap
brickcommd-100ap
brickcomob-100ae
brickcomosd-040e
brickcomwcb-100ap
brickcomwfb-100ap

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • brickcom 100ap device firmware3.1.0.8
  • brickcom fb-100apall versions
  • brickcom md-100apall versions
  • brickcom ob-100aeall versions
  • brickcom osd-040eall versions
  • brickcom wcb-100apall versions
  • brickcom wfb-100apall versions

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2013-3689Brickcom FB-100Ap, WCB-100Ap, MD-100Ap, WFB-100Ap, OB-100Ae, OSD-040E, and possibly other camera models with firmware 3.0.6.16C1 and earlier
    31Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Exploit-DB entry ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Exploit-DB entryremote2013-06-12

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. First PoC-112 d
  2. Published
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+4747 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

    If successful

    Confidentiality
    P · data can be read
    Integrity
    P · data or configuration can be modified
    Availability
    P · the service can be disrupted
    Attack complexity
    M
    Confidentiality impact
    P
    Integrity impact
    P
    Availability impact
    P

    CVSS vector

    AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

    nvd-primary

    Root cause

    State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.

    A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

    Vulnerable

    ts
    app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);

    Fixed

    ts
    app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);

    Attack context

    MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

    Noroxi analysis

    No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

    We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

    We use this product, ask for help

    Change log

    No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

    References

    Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

    All records