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CVE-2013-3619· NVD / CVE Program· CNA certcc

Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) with firmware for Supermicro X9 generation motherboards before SMT_X9_317 and firmware for

Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) with firmware for Supermicro X9 generation motherboards before SMT_X9_317 and firmware for Supermicro X8 generation motherboards before SMT X8 312 contain harcoded private encryption keys for the (1) Lighttpd web server SSL interface and the (2) Dropbear SSH daemon.

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.1—Weaponized No fix recorded
Published
Jan 2, 2020
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
9.7% · 95th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

35

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
3 / 30 · 9.7%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
supermicrosmt x9 firmware
supermicrosh7758
supermicrosmt x8 firmware
supermicrosh7757
citrixnetscaler sdx firmware
citrixnetscaler sdx
citrixnetscaler firmware
citrixnetscaler
citrixnetscaler sd-wan firmware
citrixnetscaler sd-wan

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • citrix netscaler firmwareall versions
  • citrix netscaler sd-wan firmwareall versions
  • citrix netscaler sdx firmware10
  • supermicro smt x8 firmwarebefore 3.12
  • supermicro smt x9 firmwarebefore 3.15

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (certcc). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Supermicro IPMI

    • before SMT_X9_317 and before SMT X8 312affected

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2013-3620Hardcoded WSMan credentials in Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) with firmware for Supermicro X9 generation motherboards befo
    31Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Weaponized

A ready exploit tool or active in-the-wild use is known for this vulnerability. This should be your top priority.

Evidence

  • Metasploit module ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Metasploit moduleauxiliary/scanner/http/smt_ipmi_static_cert_scannerSupermicro Onboard IPMI Static SSL Certificate Scannerauxiliary2013-11-06

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Metasploit-2249 d
  2. Published
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+2463 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

The product’s vendor appears in a public program. Matched by name; verify the scope text in the program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";

Fixed

ts
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

All records