Z-Wave devices from Sierra Designs (circa 2013) and Silicon Labs (using S0 security) may use a known, shared network key of all zeros, allow
Z-Wave devices from Sierra Designs (circa 2013) and Silicon Labs (using S0 security) may use a known, shared network key of all zeros, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof Z-Wave traffic.
- Published
- Feb 4, 2022
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 45th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-327
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Report tools
Action score
33
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 33 / 40 · 8.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| silabs | zgm130s037hgn firmware | cpe:2.3:o:silabs:zgm130s037hgn_firmware |
| silabs | zgm130s037hgn | cpe:2.3:h:silabs:zgm130s037hgn |
| silabs | zm5202 firmware | cpe:2.3:o:silabs:zm5202_firmware |
| silabs | zm5202 | cpe:2.3:h:silabs:zm5202 |
| silabs | zm5101 firmware | cpe:2.3:o:silabs:zm5101_firmware |
| silabs | zm5101 | cpe:2.3:h:silabs:zm5101 |
| silabs | zgm2305a27hgn firmware | cpe:2.3:o:silabs:zgm2305a27hgn_firmware |
| silabs | zgm2305a27hgn | cpe:2.3:h:silabs:zgm2305a27hgn |
| silabs | zgm230sb27hgn firmware | cpe:2.3:o:silabs:zgm230sb27hgn_firmware |
| silabs | zgm230sb27hgn | cpe:2.3:h:silabs:zgm230sb27hgn |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- silabs zgm130s037hgn firmwares2
- silabs zgm2305a27hgn firmwares2
- silabs zgm230sb27hgn firmwares2
- silabs zm5101 firmwares2
- silabs zm5202 firmwares2
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (certcc). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Sierra Designs Z-Wave
- S0 and later · before S0affected
Silicon Labs Z-Wave
- S0affected
Same product
silabs: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2018-25029The Z-Wave specification requires that S2 security can be downgraded to S0 or other less secure protocols, allowing an attacker within radio32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-327 · Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic AlgorithmCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Encryption Brute ForcingCAPEC-20likelihood: Low · Low
- Creating a Rogue Certification Authority CertificateCAPEC-459likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Signature SpoofCAPEC-473
- Signature Spoofing by Improper ValidationCAPEC-475likelihood: Low · High
- Cryptanalysis of Cellular EncryptionCAPEC-608High
- Rooting SIM CardsCAPEC-614High
- CryptanalysisCAPEC-97likelihood: Low · Very High
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- orangecyberdefense.com/global/blog/sensepost/blackhat-conference-z-wave-security/
- sensepost.com/cms/resources/conferences/2013/bh_zwave/Security%20Evaluation%20of%20Z-Wave_WP.pdf
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.