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CVE-2012-5367· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in OrangeHRM 2.7.1 RC 1 allow remote authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary SQL commands v

Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in OrangeHRM 2.7.1 RC 1 allow remote authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the sortField parameter to (1) viewCustomers, (2) viewPayGrades, or (3) viewSystemUsers in symfony/web/index.php/admin/, as demonstrated using cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks.

MediumCVSS 6.0 · v2.0—Proof of concept No fix recorded
Published
Dec 3, 2012
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
1.3% · 70th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

24

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
24 / 40 · 6.0 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.3%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
orangehrmorangehrm

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • orangehrm orangehrm2.7.1

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2007-1193Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the Login page in OrangeHRM before 20070212 have unknown impact and attack vectors.
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2025-66224OrangeHRM is Vulnerable to Code Execution Through Arbitrary File Write from Sendmail Parameter Injection
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2019-12839In OrangeHRM 4.3.1 and before, there is an input validation error within admin/listMailConfiguration (txtSendmailPath parameter) that allows
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2025-66289OrangeHRM is Vulnerable to Persistent Session Access Due to Missing Invalidation After User Disable and Password Change
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2025-66225OrangeHRM is Vulnerable to Account Takeover Through Unvalidated Username in Password Reset Workflow
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2024-36428OrangeHRM 3.3.3 allows admin/viewProjects sortOrder SQL injection.
    33Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Exploit-DB entry ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Exploit-DB entrywebapps2012-11-07

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. First PoC-27 d
  2. Published
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+5049 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

    If successful

    Confidentiality
    P · data can be read
    Integrity
    P · data or configuration can be modified
    Availability
    P · the service can be disrupted
    Attack complexity
    M
    Confidentiality impact
    P
    Integrity impact
    P
    Availability impact
    P

    CVSS vector

    AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P

    nvd-primary

    Root cause

    The query text is built by concatenating user input. The database cannot tell where the data ends and the command begins.

    A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

    Vulnerable

    ts
    const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query(  "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = '" + owner + "'");

    Fixed

    ts
    const owner = req.query.owner;const rows = await db.query(  "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = $1",  [owner]);

    Noroxi analysis

    No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

    We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

    We use this product, ask for help

    Change log

    No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

    References

    All records