mount.ecrpytfs_private sets group owner of /etc/mtab to user's primary group
When mount.ecrpytfs_private before version 87-0ubuntu1.2 calls setreuid() it doesn't also set the effective group id. So when it creates the new version, mtab.tmp, it's created with the group id of the user running mount.ecryptfs_private.
- Published
- Apr 22, 2019
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.0% · 61th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-254
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Report tools
Action score
39
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.0%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 9.8
- CNA · mitre
- 3.8
- 6.0 point gap
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| mount.ecrpytfs private project | mount.ecrpytfs private | cpe:2.3:a:mount.ecrpytfs_private_project:mount.ecrpytfs_private |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- mount.ecrpytfs private project mount.ecrpytfs privateall versions
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | ecryptfs-utils | before 92-1 | 92-1 |
| Debian:5.0 | ecryptfs-utils | before 68-1+lenny1 | 68-1+lenny1 |
| Debian:6.0 | ecryptfs-utils | before 83-4+squeeze1 | 83-4+squeeze1 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:5::client | ecryptfs-utils | before 0:75-5.el5_7.2 | 0:75-5.el5_7.2 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:5::client | ecryptfs-utils-debuginfo | before 0:75-5.el5_7.2 | 0:75-5.el5_7.2 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:5::client | ecryptfs-utils-gui | before 0:75-5.el5_7.2 | 0:75-5.el5_7.2 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:5::client_workstation | ecryptfs-utils-devel | before 0:75-5.el5_7.2 | 0:75-5.el5_7.2 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:6::server | ecryptfs-utils | before 0:82-6.el6_1.3 | 0:82-6.el6_1.3 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:6::server | ecryptfs-utils-debuginfo | before 0:82-6.el6_1.3 | 0:82-6.el6_1.3 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:6::server | ecryptfs-utils-devel | before 0:82-6.el6_1.3 | 0:82-6.el6_1.3 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:6::server | ecryptfs-utils-python | before 0:82-6.el6_1.3 | 0:82-6.el6_1.3 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| debian:ecryptfs-utils | 92-1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:ecryptfs-utils | 0:75-5.el5_7.2 · Red Hat:enterprise_linux:5::client | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:ecryptfs-utils-debuginfo | 0:75-5.el5_7.2 · Red Hat:enterprise_linux:5::client | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:ecryptfs-utils-devel | 0:75-5.el5_7.2 · Red Hat:enterprise_linux:5::client_workstation | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:ecryptfs-utils-gui | 0:75-5.el5_7.2 · Red Hat:enterprise_linux:5::client | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:ecryptfs-utils-python | 0:82-6.el6_1.3 · Red Hat:enterprise_linux:6::server | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-254 · 7PK - Security FeaturesCVSS vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.