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CVE-2010-4107· NVD / CVE Program· CNA hp

The default configuration of the PJL Access value in the File System External Access settings on HP LaserJet MFP printers, Color LaserJet MF

The default configuration of the PJL Access value in the File System External Access settings on HP LaserJet MFP printers, Color LaserJet MFP printers, and LaserJet 4100, 4200, 4300, 5100, 8150, and 9000 printers enables PJL commands that use the device's filesystem, which allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a command inside a print job, as demonstrated by a directory traversal attack.

HighCVSS 7.8 · v2.0—Proof of concept No fix recorded
Published
Nov 17, 2010
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
13.2% · 96th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

35

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
4 / 30 · 13.2%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
hp9000
hpcolor laserjet mfp
hplaserjet 4100
hplaserjet 4200
hplaserjet 4300
hplaserjet 5100
hplaserjet 8150
hplaserjet mfp

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • hp 9000all versions
  • hp color laserjet mfpall versions
  • hp laserjet 4100all versions
  • hp laserjet 4200all versions
  • hp laserjet 4300all versions
  • hp laserjet 5100all versions
  • hp laserjet 8150all versions
  • hp laserjet mfpall versions

Same product

hp: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-1999-1163Vulnerability in HP Series 800 S/X/V Class servers allows remote attackers to gain access to the S/X/V Class console via the Service Support
    31Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Exploit-DB entry ×4

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Exploit-DB entryremote2011-08-07
Exploit-DB entryremote2011-08-07
Exploit-DB entryremote2010-11-29
Exploit-DB entrywebapps2014-04-23

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. First PoC+11 d
  3. TodaySep 30, 2026+5796 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
C · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack complexity
Low
Confidentiality impact
C
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:N/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

All records