CVE-2010-3863: Apache Shiro before 1.1.0, and JSecurity 0.9.x, does not canonicalize URI paths before comparing them to entries in the shiro.ini file…
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 36/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (Exploit-DB, GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 54.5% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 99% of all records.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: org.apache.shiro:shiro-root (Maven) 1.1.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to org.apache.shiro:shiro-root (Maven) 1.1.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Apache Shiro before 1.1.0, and JSecurity 0.9.x, does not canonicalize URI paths before comparing them to entries in the shiro.ini file, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted request, as demonstrated by the /./account/index.jsp URI.
- Published
- Nov 5, 2010
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 54.5% · 99th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-22
Report tools
Action score
36
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 20 / 40 · 5.0 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 16 / 30 · 54.5%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache shiroup to 1.0.0 inclusive
- jsecurity jsecurity0.9.0
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.apache.shiro:shiro-root | before 1.1.0 | 1.1.0 |
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2020-17523Apache Shiro before 1.7.1, when using Apache Shiro with Spring, a specially crafted HTTP request may cause an authentication bypass.65This week
- CVE-2021-41303Apache Shiro before 1.8.0, when using Apache Shiro with Spring Boot, a specially crafted HTTP request may cause an authentication bypass62This week
- CVE-2022-32532Authentication Bypass Vulnerability47Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →CVE-2014-0074Oct 6, 2014 · Apache Shiro 1.x before 1.2.3, when using an LDAP server with unauthenticated bind enabled, allows remote attackers to bypass…32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2016-6802Sep 20, 2016 · Apache Shiro before 1.3.2 allows attackers to bypass intended servlet filters and gain access by leveraging use of a non-root servlet…33Monitor
- Later →CVE-2019-12422Nov 18, 2019 · Apache Shiro before 1.4.2, when using the default "remember me" configuration, cookies could be susceptible to a padding attack.33Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:org.apache.shiro:shiro-root | 1.1.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Exploit-DB entry ×1
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit-DB entry | remote | 2010-11-02 |
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:1 | 2025-10-31 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- First PoC-4 d
- Published
- TodayNov 16, 2026+5855 d
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- P · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Confidentiality impact
- P
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')CVSS vector
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-22 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);
res.sendFile(file);Fixed
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);
if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {
return res.sendStatus(400);
}
res.sendFile(file);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Path TraversalCAPEC-126likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.