The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm is not collision resistant, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to conduct spoofing attac
The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm is not collision resistant, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to conduct spoofing attacks, as demonstrated by attacks on the use of MD5 in the signature algorithm of an X.509 certificate.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for help- Published
- Jan 5, 2009
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 9.9% · 95th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-310
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Report tools
Action score
42
Plan
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 3 / 30 · 9.9%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Affected systems
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- ietf md5all versions
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat:certificate_system:7.3 | rhpki-ca | before 0:7.3.0-21.el4 | 0:7.3.0-21.el4 |
| Red Hat:certificate_system:7.3 | rhpki-common | before 0:7.3.0-41.el4 | 0:7.3.0-41.el4 |
| Red Hat:certificate_system:7.3 | rhpki-util | before 0:7.3.0-21.el4 | 0:7.3.0-21.el4 |
| Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | pki-ca | before 0:8.0.7-1.el5pki | 0:8.0.7-1.el5pki |
| Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | pki-common | before 0:8.0.6-2.el5pki | 0:8.0.6-2.el5pki |
| Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | pki-common-javadoc | before 0:8.0.6-2.el5pki | 0:8.0.6-2.el5pki |
| Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | pki-util | before 0:8.0.5-1.el5pki | 0:8.0.5-1.el5pki |
| Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | pki-util-javadoc | before 0:8.0.5-1.el5pki | 0:8.0.5-1.el5pki |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| red hat:pki-ca | 0:8.0.7-1.el5pki · Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:pki-common | 0:8.0.6-2.el5pki · Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:pki-common-javadoc | 0:8.0.6-2.el5pki · Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:pki-util | 0:8.0.5-1.el5pki · Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:pki-util-javadoc | 0:8.0.5-1.el5pki · Red Hat:certificate_system:8::el5 | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:rhpki-ca | 0:7.3.0-21.el4 · Red Hat:certificate_system:7.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:rhpki-common | 0:7.3.0-41.el4 · Red Hat:certificate_system:7.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:rhpki-util | 0:7.3.0-21.el4 · Red Hat:certificate_system:7.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Exploit-DB entry ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit-DB entry | dos | 2004-12-07 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- First PoC-1491 d
- Published
- TodaySep 30, 2026+6477 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-310 · Cryptographic IssuesCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- blog.mozilla.com/security/2008/12/30/md5-weaknesses-could-lead-to-certificate-forgery/
- blogs.technet.com/swi/archive/2008/12/30/information-regarding-md5-collisions-problem.aspx
- secunia.com/advisories/33826
- secunia.com/advisories/34281
- secunia.com/advisories/42181
- securityreason.com/securityalert/4866
- securitytracker.com/id?1024697
- www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_response09186a0080a5d24a.html
- www.doxpara.com/research/md5/md5_someday.pdf
- www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068
- www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx
- www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/
- www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/499685/100/0/threaded
- www.securityfocus.com/bid/33065
- www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-740-1
- www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/SoftIntCodeSign/
- www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/
- blogs.verisign.com/ssl-blog/2008/12/on_md5_vulnerabilities_and_mit.php
- bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=648886
- h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c05289935
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.