The KAME IKE Daemon Racoon, when authenticating a peer during Phase 1, validates the X.509 certificate but does not verify the RSA signature
The KAME IKE Daemon Racoon, when authenticating a peer during Phase 1, validates the X.509 certificate but does not verify the RSA signature authentication, which allows remote attackers to establish unauthorized IP connections or conduct man-in-the-middle attacks using a valid, trusted X.509 certificate.
- Published
- Jun 1, 2004
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 3.6% · 89th percentile
- CWE
- —
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Report tools
Action score
31
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 3.6%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| kame | racoon | cpe:2.3:a:kame:racoon |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- kame racoonall versions
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:3::as | ipsec-tools | before 0:0.2.5-0.4 | 0:0.2.5-0.4 |
| Red Hat:enterprise_linux:3::as | ipsec-tools-debuginfo | before 0:0.2.5-0.4 | 0:0.2.5-0.4 |
Same product
kame: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2004-0607The eay_check_x509cert function in KAME Racoon successfully verifies certificates even when OpenSSL validation fails, which could allow remo42Plan
- CVE-2004-0164KAME IKE daemon (racoon) does not properly handle hash values, which allows remote attackers to delete certificates via (1) a certain delete22Monitor
- CVE-2004-0392racoon before 20040407b allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and dropped connections) via an IKE message with21Monitor
- CVE-2004-0403Racoon before 20040408a allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via an ISAKMP packet with a large length f21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| red hat:ipsec-tools | 0:0.2.5-0.4 · Red Hat:enterprise_linux:3::as | Package registry (OSV) |
| red hat:ipsec-tools-debuginfo | 0:0.2.5-0.4 · Red Hat:enterprise_linux:3::as | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- P · data can be read
- Integrity
- P · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- P · the service can be disrupted
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Confidentiality impact
- P
- Integrity impact
- P
- Availability impact
- P
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/UnixWare/SCOSA-2005.10/SCOSA-2005.10.txt
- marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=108136746911000&w=2
- marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=108369640424244&w=2
- secunia.com/advisories/11328
- www.gentoo.org/security/en/glsa/glsa-200406-17.xml
- www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/552398
- www.mandrakesecure.net/en/advisories/advisory.php?name=MDKSA-2004:069
- www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDKSA-2004:027
- www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2004-165.html
- www.securityfocus.com/bid/10072
- oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A9291
- oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A945
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.