Format string vulnerability in Gnu Privacy Guard (aka GnuPG or gpg) 1.05 and earlier can allow an attacker to gain privileges via format str
Format string vulnerability in Gnu Privacy Guard (aka GnuPG or gpg) 1.05 and earlier can allow an attacker to gain privileges via format strings in the original filename that is stored in an encrypted file.
- Published
- Aug 14, 2001
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 13.7% · 96th percentile
- CWE
- —
Sign in to follow · You’ll be notified if a followed record enters KEV, gets an exploit or is updated.
Report tools
Action score
34
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 4 / 30 · 13.7%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| gnu | privacy guard | cpe:2.3:a:gnu:privacy_guard |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- gnu privacy guard7.1
- gnu privacy guard7.2
- gnu privacy guard8.0
Same product
gnu: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2006-6235A "stack overwrite" vulnerability in GnuPG (gpg) 1.x before 1.4.6, 2.x before 2.0.2, and 1.9.0 through 1.9.95 allows attackers to execute ar42Plan
- CVE-2003-0255The key validation code in GnuPG before 1.2.2 does not properly determine the validity of keys with multiple user IDs and assigns the greate42Plan
- CVE-2003-0978Format string vulnerability in gpgkeys_hkp (experimental HKP interface) for the GnuPG (gpg) client 1.2.3 and earlier, and 1.3.3 and earlier,31Monitor
- CVE-2000-0974GnuPG (gpg) 1.0.3 does not properly check all signatures of a file containing multiple documents, which allows an attacker to modify content31Monitor
- CVE-2006-0049gpg in GnuPG before 1.4.2.2 does not properly verify non-detached signatures, which allows attackers to inject unsigned data via a data pack21Monitor
- CVE-2003-0971GnuPG (GPG) 1.0.2, and other versions up to 1.2.3, creates ElGamal type 20 (sign+encrypt) keys using the same key component for encryption a21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Exploit-DB entry ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit-DB entry | remote | 2001-05-29 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- First PoC-77 d
- Published
- TodaySep 30, 2026+9179 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- P · data can be read
- Integrity
- P · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- P · the service can be disrupted
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Confidentiality impact
- P
- Integrity impact
- P
- Availability impact
- P
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- distro.conectiva.com.br/atualizacoes/?id=a&anuncio=000399
- download.immunix.org/ImmunixOS/7.0/updates/IMNX-2001-70-023-01
- online.securityfocus.com/archive/1/188218
- www.calderasystems.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-020.0.txt
- www.debian.org/security/2001/dsa-061
- www.gnupg.org/whatsnew.html#rn20010529
- www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403051
- www.linux-mandrake.com/en/security/2001/MDKSA-2001-053.php3
- www.novell.com/linux/security/advisories/2001_020_gpg_txt.html
- www.osvdb.org/1845
- www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-073.html
- www.securityfocus.com/bid/2797
- www.turbolinux.com/pipermail/tl-security-announce/2001-June/000439.html
- exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/6642
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.