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CVE-2026-88018· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

rclone serve s3: --auth-proxy without --auth-key authenticates nobody - full SigV4 signature bypass

rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.1, rclone serve s3 configured with --auth-proxy but without --auth-key allows authPairMiddleware to register any client-chosen accessKeyID with an empty ws.s3Secret. gofakes3 then verifies the request’s SigV4 signature against that same empty secret, while Server.auth passes the access key identifier as both the user and authentication value to the proxy without an independent per-identity secret. An unauthenticated network attacker can therefore choose an arbitrary access key, sign with an empty secret, and reach whatever backend the auth-proxy script resolves for that identity. This issue is fixed in version 1.75.1.

CriticalCVSS 9.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Sep 10, 2026
Updated
Sep 14, 2026
EPSS
0.5% · 41th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

39

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.5%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
9.8
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Affected systems

VendorProduct
rclonerclone

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • rclone rclonebefore 1.75.1

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • rclone rclone

    • < 1.75.1affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:12rcloneall versions—
Gogithub.com/rclone/rclonebefore 1.75.11.75.1

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-49980Rclone: Unauthenticated command execution in `rclone rcd --rc-serve` via inline remote instantiation, bypassing CVE-2026-41179 fix
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2026-41179RClone: Unauthenticated operations/fsinfo allows attacker-controlled backend instantiation and local command execution
    38Monitor
  • CVE-2026-79782rclone before 1.74.4 Security Token Disclosure via HTTPS to HTTP Redirect
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2026-41176Rclone: Unauthenticated options/set allows runtime auth bypass, leading to sensitive operations and command execution
    37Monitor
  • CVE-2026-88044rclone: RC per-server auth-proxy bypass
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-59733rclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overwrite and delete other users' repositories
    35Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
rclone rclone1.75.1 · descriptionVendor (CNA)
Go:github.com/rclone/rclone1.75.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

—

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

  • CVE-2026-5973358 days apartrclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overwrite and delete other users' repositories
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-7130936 days apartrclone: Incomplete path validation allows backend root escape in serve restic
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2026-7131236 days apartrclone: PowerShell Smart-Quote Filename Injection Enables SFTP Server-Side Command Execution
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-939879 days apartrclone serve docker Path Traversal via Volume Name
    18Monitor

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

ts
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

All records