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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-4c35-wcg5-mm9h: next-intl has prototype pollution with `experimental.messages.precompile` via attacker-controlled translation catalog keys

MediumCVSS 4.2 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 16/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. A user must open a link or visit a page. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: next-intl (npm) 4.9.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to next-intl (npm) 4.9.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary `setNestedProperty` in `packages/next-intl/src/extractor/utils.tsx` walks a dotted key path and assigns the final value without blocking the reserved keys `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`. When the next-intl Next.js plugin is configured with `experimental.messages` and `messages.precompile: true`, a JSON translation catalog containing a top‑level `__proto__` key causes `setNestedProperty(result, '__proto__.isAdmin', compiledMessage)` to assign onto `Object.prototype`, polluting every object in the running build process. ## Details Root cause — `packages/next-intl/src/extractor/utils.tsx:13-34`: ```ts export function setNestedProperty( obj: Record<string, any>, keyPath: string, value: any ): void { const keys = keyPath.split('.'); let current = obj; for (let i = 0; i < keys.length - 1; i++) { const key = keys[i]; if ( !(key in current) || typeof current[key] !== 'object' || current[key] === null ) { current[key] = {}; } current = current[key]; } current[keys[keys.length - 1]] = value; } ``` The existence check `!(key in current)` uses the `in` operator, which walks the prototype chain. For `key === '__proto__'`, `'__proto__' in {}` is `true` (it's inherited from `Object.prototype`) and `typeof current['__proto__'] === 'object'` (it *is* `Object.prototype`). The guard therefore never re-initializes `current[key]`, and `current = current['__proto__']` redirects all subsequent writes onto `Object.prototype`. The final assignment `current[keys[keys.length-1]] = value` sets `Object.prototype[<attacker key>] = <attacker value>`. Build-time data flow: 1. `packages/next-intl/src/plugin/catalog/catalogLoader.tsx:55-83` — the webpack/turbopack loader receives the catalog file `source` and, if `options.messages.precompile` is enabled, calls `codec.decode(source, {locale})`. 2. `packages/next-intl/src/extractor/format/codecs/JSONCodec.tsx:9-18` — `decode` runs `JSON.parse(source)`. V8 installs `__proto__` as an **own data property** on the result when the JSON key is literally `"__proto__"` (bypassing the normal `Object.prototype.__proto__` setter that would otherwise reassign the prototype). 3. `JSONCodec.tsx:33-53` — `traverseMessages` iterates `Object.keys(obj)`, which for a JSON‑parsed object includes the own `__proto__` key. It reads `obj.__proto__` (returns the attacker’s nested object, not `Object.prototype`, because it's an own property), recurses into it, and emits message id `__proto__.isAdmin`. 4. `catalogLoader.tsx:71` — `precompileMessages(decoded, cache)`. 5. `catalogLoader.tsx:89-131` — for each message, calls `setNestedProperty(result, message.id, compiledMessage)`. With `message.id === '__proto__.isAdmin'`, `setNestedProperty` walks into `Object.prototype` and assigns `Object.prototype.isAdmin = compiledMessage`. The same sink is also reachable via `JSONCodec.encode` (`JSONCodec.tsx:20-26`) and `POCodec` (`packages/next-intl/src/extractor/format/codecs/POCodec.tsx:87`) during extraction, both of which feed attacker-influenced `message.id` values into `setNestedProperty` — but those paths require control of source-code identifiers, which is a weaker attack vector than the build-time catalog path above. After pollution, every subsequent object access during the remainder of the Next.js build pipeline (webpack, turbopack, babel, next-intl’s own logic) inherits the attacker-controlled properties. This is a classic gadget-chain precondition for corrupting build-tool internals and tampering with generated bundles, since many build tools use patterns like `if (obj.someFlag)` or `options[key] ?? default` that are sensitive to polluted prototypes. Trust boundary note: next-intl’s message catalogs are realistically attacker-influenced in practice. Translation files are routinely round-tripped through external TMS systems (Crowdin, Lokalise, Transifex), accepted via community locale PRs, or pulled from third-party translation packages — any of which can carry a crafted `__proto__` key unnoticed, since JSON translation diffs are usually merged with minimal scrutiny. ## PoC Prerequisites: a Next.js project using next-intl ≤ 4.9.1 with the Next.js plugin configured: ```ts // next.config.ts import createNextIntlPlugin from 'next-intl/plugin'; const withNextIntl = createNextIntlPlugin({ experimental: { messages: { path: './messages', format: 'json', locales: 'infer', precompile: true } } }); export default withNextIntl({}); ``` 1. Drop a malicious catalog at `messages/en.json`: ```json { "Greeting": "Hello", "__proto__": { "isAdmin": "polluted" } } ``` 2. Run `next build` (or `next dev`). The `catalogLoader` will invoke `JSONCodec.decode` → `traverseMessages` → `precompileMessages` → `setNestedProperty`. 3. Minimal reproduction of the sink itself (verified locally against the v4.9.1 source): ```js function setNestedProperty(obj, keyPath, value) { const keys = keyPath.split('.'); let current = obj; for (let i = 0; i < keys.length - 1; i++) { const key = keys[i]; if (!(key in current) || typeof current[key] !== 'object' || current[key] === null) { current[key] = {}; } current = current[key]; } current[keys[keys.length - 1]] = value; } setNestedProperty({}, '__proto__.isAdmin', 'PWNED'); console.log(({}).isAdmin); // -> "PWNED" ``` Output: `PWNED`. 4. Full chain reproduction (also verified): ```js const parsed = JSON.parse('{"Greeting":"Hello","__proto__":{"isAdmin":"polluted"}}'); // traverseMessages emits: [{id:"Greeting",message:"Hello"},{id:"__proto__.isAdmin",message:"polluted"}] // precompileMessages then calls setNestedProperty(result, "__proto__.isAdmin", "polluted") console.log(({}).isAdmin); // -> "polluted" ``` After the loader runs, `({}).isAdmin === 'polluted'` for the remainder of the build Node process. ## Impact - `Object.prototype` is polluted for the lifetime of the build‑time Node.js process, affecting every object created or inspected thereafter in the Next.js build pipeline (webpack/turbopack loaders, babel plugins, next-intl’s own codecs, user plugins). - Classic CWE-1321 gadget-chain precondition: downstream tools that branch on `obj.someFlag`, `options[key] ?? default`, `if (!config.noX)`, etc. can be coerced into unintended behavior, including emitting tampered bundles. - Realistic delivery vectors include TMS round-trips (Crowdin/Lokalise/Transifex), community locale PRs, and compromised/transitively-installed translation packages — all situations where a JSON catalog diff is routinely accepted without the scrutiny given to code changes. - Exploitation requires the user to opt in to the `experimental.messages` + `precompile` configuration. Users who do not use the extractor/precompile features are not affected. ## Recommended Fix Reject reserved keys in `setNestedProperty` and stop using the `in` operator for the existence check. A minimal patch to `packages/next-intl/src/extractor/utils.tsx`: ```ts const FORBIDDEN_KEYS = new Set(['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']); export function setNestedProperty( obj: Record<string, any>, keyPath: string, value: any ): void { const keys = keyPath.split('.'); for (const key of keys) { if (FORBIDDEN_KEYS.has(key)) { throw new Error(`Invalid message id segment: ${key}`); } } let current = obj; for (let i = 0; i < keys.length - 1; i++) { const key = keys[i]; if ( !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(current, key) || typeof current[key] !== 'object' || current[key] === null ) { current[key] = Object.create(null); } current = current[key]; } current[keys[keys.length - 1]] = value; } ``` Additionally: - In `packages/next-intl/src/extractor/format/codecs/JSONCodec.tsx`, make `traverseMessages` skip reserved keys (or switch to `Object.create(null)` + `Object.hasOwn` semantics) so that a malicious catalog is rejected early with a clear error rather than producing `__proto__.*` message ids. - In `packages/next-intl/src/plugin/catalog/catalogLoader.tsx`, initialize `precompileMessages`’s `result` with `Object.create(null)` as defense in depth, so even if a key slipped through it could not redirect through `Object.prototype`.

Published
May 6, 2026
Updated
May 6, 2026
EPSS
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Action score

16

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
16 / 40 · 4.2 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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VendorProduct
npmnext-intl

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmnext-intlbefore 4.9.24.9.2

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:next-intl4.9.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

osv

References

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