Superlinear CPU denial of service in Erlang/OTP ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER decoder
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.26% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Erlang OTP 0fe2c02fdc06fab1c63be9db1a7456993d20f838, 27.3.4.18, 28.5.0.7; azl3 erlang 26.2.5.21-6 on Azure Linux 3.0 26.2.5.21-7.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Erlang OTP 0fe2c02fdc06fab1c63be9db1a7456993d20f838, 27.3.4.18, 28.5.0.7; azl3 erlang 26.2.5.21-6 on Azure Linux 3.0 26.2.5.21-7 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Inefficient algorithmic complexity in the Erlang/OTP asn1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER decoder allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause denial of service by sending a crafted OID during the TLS handshake. The BER OID decoder asn1rtt_ber:dec_subidentifiers/3 in lib/asn1/src/asn1rtt_ber.erl and the equivalent PER helper asn1rtt_per_common:dec_subidentifiers/3 in lib/asn1/src/asn1rtt_per_common.erl accumulate a base-128 subidentifier into an unbounded integer using (Av bsl 7) + H per continuation byte. Each shift and addition on the growing accumulator is linear in the number of bits already accumulated, giving quadratic total work in the size of a single subidentifier. The JER helper asn1rtt_jer:json2oid/1 in lib/asn1/src/asn1rtt_jer.erl exhibits the same class of unbounded-integer parsing when decoding a dot-separated OID from JSON. A DER-encoded OBJECT IDENTIFIER with one very large arc (approximately 262 KB of continuation bytes) consumes roughly 13 seconds of CPU on typical hardware. The vulnerable decoder is generated into every ASN.1 module that contains an OBJECT IDENTIFIER, including OTP-PUB-KEY which is reached during X.509 certificate parsing via public_key:pkix_decode_cert/2. This decoder runs before any signature or trust chain verification, so any Erlang service that parses peer TLS certificates is exposed: the default for TLS clients (which always parse the server certificate) and for mutual-TLS servers (which parse client certificates). This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/asn1/src/asn1rtt_ber.erl, lib/asn1/src/asn1rtt_per_common.erl and lib/asn1/src/asn1rtt_jer.erl and program routines asn1rtt_ber:dec_subidentifiers/3, asn1rtt_per_common:dec_subidentifiers/3 and asn1rtt_jer:json2oid/1. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.18, OTP 28.5.0.7, and OTP 29.1.1, corresponding to asn1 from 3.0 before 5.3.4.3, 5.4.3.1, and 5.5.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to asn1 before 3.0, is affected is unknown.
- Published
- Sep 22, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 24, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 17th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-407
Report tools
Action score
32
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.2 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 8.2
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Erlang OTP
- 17.0 and lateraffected · otpfixed in 27.3.4.18, 28.5.0.7, 29.1.1
- 3.0 and lateraffected · otpfixed in 5.3.4.3, 5.4.3.1, 5.5.2
- 84adefa331c4159d432d22840663c38f155cd4c1 and later · before 0fe2c02fdc06fab1c63be9db1a7456993d20f838affected · git
- 0fe2c02fdc06fab1c63be9db1a7456993d20f838 and laternot affected · git
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | erlang | all versions | — |
| Debian:14 | erlang | before 1:29.1.1+dfsg-1 | 1:29.1.1+dfsg-1 |
Same product
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- CVE-2026-74835inets,httpd: Memory Exhaustion via Unenforced max_body_size During Chunked Body Reception34Monitor
- CVE-2026-71380httpd applies no timeout while receiving a request body, parking a worker on a stalled client34Monitor
- CVE-2026-70399httpd does not enforce the documented default max_clients connection limit34Monitor
- CVE-2026-69664httpd parks a request worker indefinitely on a malformed chunk size sent after the headers34Monitor
- CVE-2026-73812inets, httpd: HTTP Request Smuggling via Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length33Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP | 0fe2c02fdc06fab1c63be9db1a7456993d20f838 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Erlang OTP | 27.3.4.18 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Erlang OTP | 28.5.0.7 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Erlang OTP | 29.1.1 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Erlang OTP | 5.3.4.3 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Erlang OTP | 5.4.3.1 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Erlang OTP | 5.5.2 | Vendor (CNA) |
| azl3 erlang 26.2.5.21-6 on Azure Linux 3.0 | 26.2.5.21-7 · Release Notes | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| debian:erlang | 1:29.1.1+dfsg-1 · Debian:14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- tynus2reporter
- Lukas Backströmreporter
- John Högbergremediation developer
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-407 · Inefficient Algorithmic ComplexityCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.