Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 23/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.19% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: network-ai (npm) 5.12.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to network-ai (npm) 5.12.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.
- Published
- Jul 20, 2026
- Updated
- Aug 13, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 8th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-352
Report tools
Action score
23
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 23 / 40 · 5.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 5.9
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| network-ai | network-ai | cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- network-ai network-ai5.0.0 and later · before 5.12.2
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Jovancoding Network-AI
- >= 5.0.0, < 5.12.2affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | network-ai | from 5.0.0 · before 5.12.2 | 5.12.2 |
Same product
network-ai: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-46701Network-AI: Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty Default Secret30Monitor
- CVE-2026-58484Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning28Monitor
- CVE-2026-58481Network-AI: AgentRuntime sandbox path-prefix checks allow file access outside the configured base directory26Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-58413Jul 20, 2026 · EnvironmentManager.restore() backup ID path traversal copies arbitrary directories into environment data24Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-58414Jul 20, 2026 · Network-AI: EnvironmentManager.backup() follows symlinked directories and copies files outside the environment root into backups22Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:network-ai | 5.12.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-352 · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
nvd-secondary
Root cause
State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-352 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);Fixed
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.