Order Delivery Date Pro for WooCommerce < 12.3.1 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary Option Update
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 39/100)
- A ready-made attack module is public (Nuclei); exploiting it takes no special expertise.
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 1.3% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 71.8% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Unknown Order Delivery Date 12.3.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Unknown Order Delivery Date 12.3.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
The Order Delivery Date WordPress plugin before 12.3.1 does not have authorization and CSRF checks when importing settings. Furthermore it also lacks proper checks to only update options relevant to the Order Delivery Date WordPress plugin before 12.3.1. This leads to attackers being able to modify the default_user_role to administrator and users_can_register, allowing them to register as an administrator of the site for complete site takeover.
- Published
- Apr 26, 2025
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.3% · 71th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-352
Report tools
Action score
39
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Is Order Delivery Date for WP e-Commerce on your site?
WP Lens reads your site's plugin, theme and WordPress versions from the outside and matches them to known vulnerabilities. Works without an account.
Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| tychesoftwares | order delivery date pro for woocommerce | cpe:2.3:a:tychesoftwares:order_delivery_date_pro_for_woocommerce |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- tychesoftwares order delivery date pro for woocommercebefore 12.3.1
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (WPScan). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Unknown Order Delivery Date
- 2.0 and later · before 12.3.1affected · semver
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Unknown Order Delivery Date | 12.3.1 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Nuclei detection template ×1
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Nuclei detection template | Nuclei template CVE-2025-2907 | — |
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2025-05-26 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+30 d
- TodayOct 19, 2026+541 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Mike Gozdiskowskifinder
- WPScancoordinator
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-352 · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Root cause
State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-352 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);Fixed
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →