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CVE-2023-52085· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Winter CMS Local File Inclusion through Server Side Template Injection

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

  • A ready-made attack module is public (Nuclei); exploiting it takes no special expertise.
  • Public proof-of-concept code exists (Exploit-DB / GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 30.1% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 98.2% of all records.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: winter/wn-backend-module (Packagist) 1.2.4.
  • Severity is disputed: the assigning authority (CNA) scores it 3.3, NVD 5.4.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to winter/wn-backend-module (Packagist) 1.2.4 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

Winter is a free, open-source content management system. Users with access to backend forms that include a ColorPicker FormWidget can provide a value that would then be included without further processing in the compilation of custom stylesheets via LESS. This had the potential to lead to a Local File Inclusion vulnerability. This issue has been patched in v1.2.4.

MediumCVSS 5.4 · v3.1—Proof of concept Fix available
Published
Dec 28, 2023
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
30.1% · 98th percentile

Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
21 / 40 · 5.4 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
9 / 30 · 30.1%

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
5.4
CNA · GitHub_M
3.3
2.1 point gap

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow CVE-2023-52085

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
wintercmswinter

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • wintercms winterbefore 1.2.4

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • wintercms winter

    • < 1.2.4affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Packagistwinter/wn-backend-modulebefore 1.2.41.2.4

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-27591Winter: Privilege escalation by authenticated backend users
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2022-39357Winter vulnerable to Prototype Pollution in Snowboard framework
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2026-79774Winter CMS before 1.2.13 Twig Sandbox Escape via SecurityPolicy
    37Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierCVE-2023-52083Dec 28, 2023 · Stored XSS through privileged upload of Media Manager file followed by renaming
    19Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2023-52084Dec 28, 2023 · Winter CMS Stored XSS through Backend ColorPicker FormWidget
    21Monitor
  • Later →CVE-2024-29686Mar 29, 2024 · Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability in Winter CMS v.1.2.3 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted p
    29Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Packagist:winter/wn-backend-module1.2.4Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Nuclei detection template ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Nuclei detection templateNuclei template CVE-2023-52085 —

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records