HTML::FormHandler versions before 0.410000 for Perl allow attacker selected method dispatch and resource exhaustion because _apply_actions and add_error use err
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 36/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.62% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: libhtml-formhandler-perl (Debian:14) 0.40068-3; perl-HTML-FormHandler (openSUSE:Tumbleweed) 0.410.2-1.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to libhtml-formhandler-perl (Debian:14) 0.40068-3; perl-HTML-FormHandler (openSUSE:Tumbleweed) 0.410.2-1.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
HTML::FormHandler versions before 0.410000 for Perl allow attacker selected method dispatch and resource exhaustion because _apply_actions and add_error use error message text built from request data as a Locale::Maketext bracket notation template. add_error hands its first argument to the language handle as the Locale::Maketext message key, and the default handle's lexicon sets `_AUTO`, so a string that is not a lexicon entry is compiled as a bracket notation template instead of being looked up. In a bracket group the first token names a method called on the language handle and the remaining tokens are its arguments. Three kinds of text the library did not author reach that position. _apply_actions installs a `$SIG{__WARN__}` handler that stores the warning text in `$error_message`, and a captured warning survives a successful action, so a field carrying a numeric transform turns `Argument "[sprintf,%50000000d,0]" isn't numeric` into the template; a warning quotes the submitted value verbatim, so the group is well formed and dispatches. `$error_message ||= $tobj->validate($new_value)` takes a type constraint's own failure message, which renders the rejected value through a partial dumper in bracket and comma form (Devel::PartialDump when Moose can load it, Type::Tiny's own dumper always), so a field with `apply => [ Str ]` given a parameter sent more than once, which arrives as an array, gets `Reference ["a","b"] did not pass type constraint "Str"` as its template, from a request that carries no bracket character of its own. A coercion or transform exception reaches it the same way. Beyond those, a validator whose message contains the field value puts that value in the template directly, and add_error replaces the message list with the contents of an arrayref first argument (`@message = @{$message[0]} if ref $message[0] eq 'ARRAY'`), so a value arriving as an array fills the argument slots from the same request as well. A malformed group such as `[0]` makes the compile croak, and HTML::FormHandler::I18N::maketext and add_error each re-raise that as a die, so process() throws. A well formed group naming sprintf reaches CORE::sprintf with an attacker chosen field width. Any caller that applies a type constraint or a transform to an untrusted field, or whose validator passes an untrusted field value to add_error, can be made to throw an unhandled exception out of process(), or to allocate an arbitrary amount of memory in one request, and an application whose language handle subclass defines side effecting public methods makes those callable with attacker chosen arguments. The dumped type constraint message is bounded to the exception, because both dumpers quote non-numeric elements so the method slot is never an attacker chosen name. The built-in messages pass fixed templates with the value in an argument slot, where it stays inert, and the built-in field types attach explicit message callbacks, so neither is affected.
- Published
- Aug 13, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 8, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 49th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-470
Report tools
Action score
36
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 36 / 40 · 9.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (CPANSec). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
cpan.org/modules HTML-FormHandler
- before 0.410000affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | libhtml-formhandler-perl | from 0 | — |
| Debian:14 | libhtml-formhandler-perl | before 0.40068-3 | 0.40068-3 |
| openSUSE:Tumbleweed | perl-HTML-FormHandler | before 0.410.2-1.1 | 0.410.2-1.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| debian:libhtml-formhandler-perl | 0.40068-3 · Debian:14 | Package registry (OSV) |
| opensuse:perl-HTML-FormHandler | 0.410.2-1.1 · openSUSE:Tumbleweed | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-470 · Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (6 more)Show less
- github.com/gshank/html-formhandler/pull/159
- metacpan.org/release/ABRAXXA/HTML-FormHandler-0.410001/changes
- metacpan.org/release/GSHANK/HTML-FormHandler-0.40068/source/lib/HTML/FormHandler/Field.pm#L861-876
- metacpan.org/release/GSHANK/HTML-FormHandler-0.40068/source/lib/HTML/FormHandler/I18N/en_us.pm#L9-11
- metacpan.org/release/GSHANK/HTML-FormHandler-0.40068/source/lib/HTML/FormHandler/Validate.pm#L161-261
- www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-6329
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.