Partial Path Traversal in com.github.jlangch:venice
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 13/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.43% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: com.github.jlangch:venice (Maven) 1.10.17.
- Severity is disputed: the assigning authority (CNA) scores it 6.1, NVD 3.3.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to com.github.jlangch:venice (Maven) 1.10.17 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Venice is a Clojure inspired sandboxed Lisp dialect with excellent Java interoperability. A partial path traversal issue exists within the functions `load-file` and `load-resource`. These functions can be limited to load files from a list of load paths. Assuming Venice has been configured with the load paths: `[ "/Users/foo/resources" ]` When passing **relative** paths to these two vulnerable functions everything is fine: `(load-resource "test.png")` => loads the file "/Users/foo/resources/test.png" `(load-resource "../resources-alt/test.png")` => rejected, outside the load path When passing **absolute** paths to these two vulnerable functions Venice may return files outside the configured load paths: `(load-resource "/Users/foo/resources/test.png")` => loads the file "/Users/foo/resources/test.png" `(load-resource "/Users/foo/resources-alt/test.png")` => loads the file "/Users/foo/resources-alt/test.png" !!! The latter call suffers from the _Partial Path Traversal_ vulnerability. This issue’s scope is limited to absolute paths whose name prefix matches a load path. E.g. for a load-path `"/Users/foo/resources"`, the actor can cause loading a resource also from `"/Users/foo/resources-alt"`, but not from `"/Users/foo/images"`. Versions of Venice before and including v1.10.17 are affected by this issue. Upgrade to Venice >= 1.10.18, if you are on a version < 1.10.18. There are currently no known workarounds.
- Published
- Aug 15, 2022
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 36th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-22
Report tools
Action score
13
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 13 / 40 · 3.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 3.3
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 6.1
- 2.8 point gap
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| venice project | venice | cpe:2.3:a:venice_project:venice |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- venice project venicebefore 1.10.17
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
jlangch venice
- <= 1.10.16affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | com.github.jlangch:venice | before 1.10.17 | 1.10.17 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:com.github.jlangch:venice | 1.10.17 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2025-08-20 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+1101 d
- TodayOct 22, 2026+1529 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-22 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);Fixed
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) { return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Path TraversalCAPEC-126likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.